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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE

:

HONRUD,

:

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

:

vs•

:
:
:
:
:

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA
KERSEY,
Defendants/Appellants,

Appeals Court
No. 920851

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court,
acting pursuant to Rule

42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court on December 15,
1992.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
1.

Should this Court affirm the District Court's findings

that BUYERS' evidence in affidavit complies with Rule 803 of Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Standard of Review:

No deference is given on appeal to

the District Court's summary judgment, since such a decision

18342.H0583.1
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resolves only questions of law.

Such a decision can be affirmed

only if the District Court was correct as a matter of law in
determining that there was both (1) no genuine issue of material
fact and (2) that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a

matter of law. Rutherford v. AT&T Communications,

,

P.2d

201 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah, December 9, 1992); Hill v. Seattle
First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992); Sandy City v. Salt
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217-218 (Utah 1992).
2.

Should

this

Court

affirm

the

District

Court's

determination that the Earnest Money Agreement, as a matter of law,
clearly and unambiguously warranted that the furnace would be in
satisfactory working condition at the time of the closing?
Standard of Review: A summary judgment is to be reviewed
for correctness, with no deference to the District Court.

Hill,

827 P.2d at 242. Review of a lower court's contract interpretation
"begins with a question of law, reviewed for correctness:

Is the

contract unambiguous?" West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). The interpretation of a contract
and its application to the parties, as determined by the words of
the agreement, is a question of law.

50 West Broadway Associates

v. The Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171
(Utah 1989) .
3.

Should

this

Court

affirm

the

District

Court's

determination that pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement, the

18342.H0583.1
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BUYERS were entitled to recover the costs incurred in replacing the
defective furnace?
Standard of Review;

This issue requires deference be

given to the lower court. The fact of damages must be proven with
reasonable certainty and "if there is competent evidence to support
the findings upon which the judgment is rendered, the judgment must
be sustained." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1986) .
4.

Should this Court affirm the District Court's award to

BUYERS of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred because of
the SELLERS' breach of CONTRACT?
Standard of Review:

This issue is within the trial

court's discretion and must be reviewed for a showing of clear
abuse of discretion by the District Court.

Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).
5.

Did the District Court appropriately award sanctions

against the SELLERS' counsel for unreasonable pursuit of issues
previously ruled upon?
Standard of Review;

Whether or not SELLERS' conduct

violated Rule 11 is a matter of law, with no deference to the
District Court. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P. 2d 163 (Utah Ct.
App 1989)

18342.H0583.1
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6.

Are the SELLERS, having failed to raise before the

District Court the issue of insufficient discovery time, precluded
from raising this issue on appeal?
Standard of Review:

This issue is before the court for

the first time.
7.

May BUYERS recover their reasonable attorneys• fees and

costs incurred in responding to SELLERS* appeal?
Standard of Review; This issue is also before the court
for the first time and is a matter of law.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Appellees believe that this Court's interpretation of Rule 803
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure will be dispositive of certain issues in this case.
Those statutes are included in Addendum A to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sellers' Statement of Facts
SELLERS have inaccurately presented facts and lower court
proceedings on appeal. For instance, SELLERS incorrectly represent
that the BUYERS filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ten days
after SELLERS answered the complaint. In fact, BUYERS filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment more than three months after SELLERS
answered the complaint.

18342.H0583.1
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SELLERS also inaccurately represent that BUYERS refused to
accept a used furnace as replacement.

In fact, BUYERS promptly

submitted the information SELLERS requested to facilitate finding
a used furnace and only replaced the furnace when left with no
alternative.

[R. 43-59]

Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings,
And Disposition In The Court Below
In 1991, BUYERS entered into a Earnest Money Agreement to
purchase SELLERS' home.

In the Agreement entered into by the

parties, SELLERS expressly warranted that the heating system in the
home would be in satisfactory condition at the time of closing.
After BUYERS took possession of the home and engaged a Mountain
Fuel representative to attempt to light the furnace for the first
time, they discovered the furnace to be in a dangerous and
unsatisfactory condition.
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County on July 29, 1991.
complaint

[R. 2-5]

BUYERS filed a

alleging breach of express warranty and breach of

contract against SELLERS to recover damages resulting from SELLERS•
failure to have the furnace in satisfactory working condition.
SELLERS filed an answer on August 28, 1991.

[R. 10-15]

BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 11,
1991.

[R. 21-59] After briefing, the Motion was argued orally to

the District Court on March 2, 1992.
18342.H0583.1
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At the end of the hearing,

the court ruled from the bench in favor of the BUYERS, and granted
their Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure*
on March 23, 1992.

Summary Judgment was signed and entered

[R. 104-106]

The District Court also ruled that BUYERS were entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement
and requested that BUYERS submit an itemized statement of their
attorneys' fees and costs to allow the court to determine the
amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded.
BUYERS' counsel filed on April 30, 1992, an itemized statement
of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred.

[R. 107-114]

objected to the statement and requested a hearing.

SELLERS

[R. 119-121]

BUYERS responded to SELLERS' Objections and filed a Motion for
Sanctions against SELLERS' counsel.

[R. 126-132]

After the

matters were fully briefed, Judge Stirba denied SELLERS' request
for a hearing, determined that BUYERS' attorneys' fees and costs,
as submitted, were reasonable, and awarded
SELLERS' counsel.
costs

and

sanctions against

The Order awarding BUYERS' attorneys' fees,

sanctions

against

SELLERS' counsel

was

signed

on

September 21, 1992 and filed with the court on September 22, 1992.
[R. 140-142]
SELLERS filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals on
October 16, 1992. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court on

18342.H0583.1
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November 10/ 1992 and poured over to the Court of Appeals on
December 15, 1992.
There are no prior or related appeals.

Statement of Facts
1.
Kersey

On or about February 25, 1991, SELLERS Dale and Barbara
("SELLERS")

entered

into

an

Earnest

Money

Contract

("CONTRACT"), to sell their home to BUYERS Dave and Stephanie
Honrud ("BUYERS").

[R. 36-40]

The CONTRACT was a standard legal

form mandated to be used by Utah realtors. It was approved by the
Utah Real Estate Commission and the office of the Utah Attorney
General.
2.

[R. 39]
The first page of the CONTRACT directed:

"This is a

legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before
signing."

Provision 11 of the CONTRACT set out, in bold print,

"unless otherwise indicated above, the general provision sections
on the reverse side hereof have been accepted by the Buyer and
Seller and are incorporated into this agreement by reference."
[R. 36, 38]
3.

Provision C of the CONTRACT warranted that the "plumbing,

heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems . . . shall be in
sound or in satisfactory working condition at the time of closing."
4.

Provision 0 of the CONTRACT provided that "except for the

express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery

18342.H0583.1
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of

final

closing

documents

(emphasis added).
closing.
5.

shall

abrogate

this

agreement."

Thus, the express warranties survived the

[R. 39, 36]
SELLERS

did

not

limit

the warranties

in any way.

Provision 6 of the CONTRACT required the sellers to manually fill
in whether or not additional items, beyond those contained in
Provision C, would be warranted. [R. 38]
6.

Closing of the sale occurred at Valley Bank & Trust

Company on or about April 15, 1991. At that time, SELLERS executed
a Warranty Deed to the subject property. Neither the warranty deed
nor

any

other

transaction

documents

contradicts,

executed

in

disclaims,

conjunction

or

limits

with

the

this

express

warranties in the CONTRACT which are deemed to survive closing.
[R. 44]
7.

Closing occurred on Monday, April 15, 1991. BUYERS could

not use or operate the furnace prior to Mountain Fuel's connecting
service because the gas had been turned off.
8.

On

the

following

Saturday,

[R. 44, 185-186]

April

20,

1991,

a

representative from Mountain Fuel came to the property to light the
furnace and to connect the fuel service in the BUYERS' name.
However,

upon

physical

inspection

of

the

furnace,

the

representative declined to light it and reported the furnace to be
in an unsafe, dangerous and life-threatening condition.

At that

time, the Mountain Fuel representative issued a Notice to the

18342.H0583.1
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BUYERS that the gas line could not be connected until the furnace
problem was corrected•
Fuel Notice,
9.

BUYERS were required to sign the Mountain

[R. 44, 54]

Pursuant to Mountain Fuel's inspection, on May 17, 1991,

BUYERS advised SELLERS of the inoperable condition of the furnace
and the serious nature of the problem. BUYERS asked the SELLERS to
move quickly to meet their contractual obligation to provide a
furnace in satisfactory working condition,

[R. 56-57] Throughout

June and July, 1991, BUYERS made numerous attempts to resolve this
matter informally with SELLERS but SELLERS refused to accept
responsibility.
10.

[R. 66-79]

On July 29, 1991, BUYERS filed a complaint alleging

breach of express warranty and breach of contract.
answered the complaint on August 28, 1991.
11.

SELLERS

[R. 2-6, 10-15]

On September 12, 1991, a meeting was held at the property

to physically verify the inoperable condition of the furnace.
Those in attendance included BUYERS, SELLER Dale Kersey and his
attorney, an agent from the inspection company, TCI, two agents
from private furnace companies and a Mountain Fuel representative.
Each of the above personally witnessed the large, visible split in
the furnace casing which caused the dangerous and life-threatening
condition. [R. 46] At this time, the Mountain Fuel representative
repeated to the BUYERS that the furnace was irreparable.
47]

18342.H0583.1
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[R. 46-

12.

At various times, SELLERS suggested that the furnace be

welded and clamped together or replaced with a used furnace.
BUYERS refused to agree to have the furnace welded, based upon
Mountain Fuel's recommendation to them that this was unsafe. As to
replacing

the furnace with a used

furnace, BUYERS responded

promptly to SELLERS' request for information to allow them to
obtain a used furnace. SELLERS took no action.

[R. 46-47] As the

cold weather season approached, BUYERS reiterated to SELLERS that
time was of the essence.

When BUYERS did not hear back from

SELLERS on the availability of a used furnace, BUYERS had no
alternative but to replace the furnace.
13.

[R. 46-47]

BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment approximately

fourteen (14) weeks after SELLERS answered the Complaint. SELLERS
responded that BUYERS' affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay.
SELLERS' counter affidavit contained numerous conclusions of
law and failed to contradict the unsatisfactory condition of the
furnace or to raise an objection based upon insufficient time to
conduct discovery.

Furthermore, SELLERS failed to address legal

arguments set forth in the BUYERS' supporting Memorandum or to
present a countering legal position.
14.

[R. 60-65]

The motion was argued on March 2, 1992. BUYERS asserted

that their affidavit was admissible under the "business record" and
"present sense impression" exceptions of Rule 803, Utah Rules of

18342.H0583.1
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Evidence, and that the evidence established the

furnace was

defective at their first attempt to use it.
Provision C of the CONTRACT expressly warranted the furnace to
be in satisfactory working condition.
the

warranties

in

any way

and

The CONTRACT did not limit

expressly

warranties would survive the closing.

provided

that

the

Thus, the CONTRACT clearly

and unequivocally warranted the condition of the furnace. [R. 163168]
15.

SELLERS admitted during oral argument that there were no

facts before the court to refute the BUYERS• evidence and asserted
that they did not need to counter BUYERS' affidavit.

[R. 170-171]

SELLERS also admitted that the Mountain Fuel representative came to
the property five days after closing to turn on the gas and that
the BUYERS could not have used the furnace until the gas was turned
on.

[R. 184-186]

SELLERS took the position that BUYERS had to

prove exactly when the crack occurred, i.e. that it occurred prior
to or on the day of closing.

[R. 174-175]

SELLERS submitted no

evidence to dispute the defective condition of the furnace.

Nor

did the SELLERS present a legal basis to absolve SELLERS from
responsibility.
16.
expressly

[R. 165-168]

The District Court found that the CONTRACT clearly and
warranted

the condition

of

the

furnace

to

be

in

satisfactory working order at closing; that BUYERS had submitted
sufficient evidence to prove the furnace was inoperable on their

18342.H0583.1
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first attempt to use it which was a more salient date than the day
of closing; and that BUYERS were entitled to a replacement.
Furthermore, under the CONTRACT, BUYERS were entitled to recover
attorneys' fees and costs.

[R. 188-192]

In order to determine reasonable attorneys1 fees, the

17.

Court directed BUYERS to submit an itemized statement of their
attorneys1 fees and costs. BUYERS submitted an itemized statement
setting out the time and effort spent by each attorney for the
different issues, pleadings and proceedings. [R. 107-108] SELLERS
objected.

However, much of SELLERS' objection centered around

issues previously decided by the court such as the evidence
presented, contract ambiguity and settlement efforts.

SELLERS

failed to submit countering evidence to prove that the time,
effort, and fees of the BUYERS' attorney were unreasonable.

[R.

119-121]

for

For

these

reasons

BUYERS

submitted

a Motion

Sanctions.
18.

SELLERS failed to recognize the rationale behind BUYERS'

Motion for Sanctions and argued for their constitutional right to
object to the award of attorneys' fees. BUYERS agreed that SELLERS
were entitled to object to the amount of attorneys' fees but
asserted that SELLERS' objection should not attempt to re-litigate
issues previously ruled upon by the Court.
19.

[R. 126-134]

The District Court found that the SELLERS' objection to

attorneys' fees did attempt to re-litigate matters previously

18342.H0583.1
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decided, that it was without merit and filed in bad faith.
Furthermore, the Court found BUYERS' attorneys' fees and costs were
reasonable and necessarily incurred.

The District Court awarded

BUYERS both attorneys' fees and costs of sanctions.

[R. 137-142]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I
The District Court's determination that BUYERS' affidavit was
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence is correct as a matter
of law. BUYERS' affidavit comes within the exceptions of Rule 803
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
BUYERS, based upon personal knowledge, testified that when
they first attempted to have Mountain Fuel connect their furnace,
they were refused service because the furnace was found to be in an
unsafe, inoperable condition.

Their affidavit comes within both

the "business record" and "present sense impression" exceptions of
Rule 803 and is admissible.
Point II
The District Court's determination that the CONTRACT was
unambiguous and that BUYERS were entitled to recover damages is
correct as a matter of law. Utah law requires that the terms of an
unambiguous contract will control.

Although SELLERS advocate a

different interpretation of the CONTRACT, a contract will not be
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rendered unambiguous merely because the parties urge different
interpretations or would prefer different results.
The terms of the CONTRACT expressly warranted that the BUYERS
would receive a furnace in satisfactory working condition.

When

the BUYERS took possession of the home and first attempted to have
it hooked up for use, the gas company found it to be unsafe and
inoperable. Thus, SELLERS had breached an express warranty of the
CONTRACT.
Under Utah law, the non-breaching party to a contract is
entitled to be put in as good a position as he would have been had
the contract been fully performed. In order to receive the benefit
of their bargain, BUYERS are entitled to recover the replacement
cost of the furnace.
Point III
The District Courtf s determination that BUYERS were entitled
to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs was not an
abuse of discretion.

In Utah, attorneys' fees are awarded if

authorized by contract or statute.

Attorneys* fees awarded at

summary judgment will be upheld if the facts support that the party
is entitled to an award and the amount awarded is reasonable.
The District Court properly determined that the BUYERS were
entitled to recover attorneys• fees under the CONTRACT if incurred
while enforcing their remedies under the CONTRACT. BUYERS filed a
detailed breakdown of the time and effort expended by each attorney
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on the different issues and pleadings for each proceeding. SELLERS
failed to submit evidence to refute BUYERS' attorneys' fees or to
prove them unreasonable.

Sufficient evidence was before the Court

to enable it to ascertain a reasonable award.
BUYERS are also entitled to an award of attorneys * fees on
appeal because, under Utah law, when a contract provides for the
payment of attorneys1 fees, it includes attorneys' fees incurred on
appeal as well.
Point IV.
The

District

Court's

determination

that

appropriate was not an abuse of discretion.

sanctions

were

Whether specific

conduct violates Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a
matter of law. If a violation is found, an appropriate sanction is
mandated and, absent an abuse of discretion, will be upheld on
appeal. The District Court found counsel•s attempt to re-litigate
previously-decided issues to be in bad faith and was justified in
awarding sanctions.
Point V.
SELLERS waived any objection they might have had concerning
inadequate time to conduct discovery by failing to raise the issue
in the lower court proceedings or to demonstrate how discovery
would change the clean language of the CONTRACT.

18342.H0583.1
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
BUYERS1 AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE
UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
A.
Statements in the Buyers' Affidavit, Attesting to
Mountain Fuel's Noticef Fall Within the Business Record Exception
of the Rules of Evidence and are Admissible.
SELLERS argue that it was error for the District Court to
consider BUYERS' affidavit which included the notice from Mountain
Fuel of the serious condition of the furnace and the BUYERS'
attitude and response thereto. Of course, it should be emphasized
that the existence of the hole in the furnace has not been disputed
because all parties saw it by inspection,

[R. 46]

The SELLERS,

rather, object to the affidavit as to its substance and, even then,
misconstrue the Rules of Evidence.
For an affidavit to be effective for summary judgment, it must
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.
v. Lamb, 436 P.2d

1021, 1022 (Utah 1968).

Preston

Utah courts have

determined that an affidavit is acceptable if it is based on
personal knowledge of the affiant and shows affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify.

Western States Thrift and Loan

Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1972).

Affidavits

containing hearsay must come within the Rules of Evidence.

If the

evidence would not properly be admitted at trial, such evidence is
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not properly set forth in the affidavit. Walker v. Rocky Mountain
Recreation, Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973).
In this case, the affidavit in question clearly includes
admissible evidence.

Utah's Rule 803, along with the majority of

the other states, mimics the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Thus,

guidance can be gained both from federal and state case law. Under
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, hearsay is admissible if it
falls within certain exceptions
exception

is

commonly

referred

outlined
to

as

in the rule.

the

"business

One

record"

exception. Business records are admissible if certain factors are
met to establish the necessary indicia of reliability.
Utah outlined factors for the "business record" exception in
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, (Utah 1983) [a criminal case
concerning the admissibility of police records.]

The court held

that a foundation should generally include:
(1) the record must be made in the regular course of the
business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the
record must have been made at the time of, or in close
proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or
event recorded;
(3) the evidence must support a
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity;
and (4) the sources of the information from which the
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation
of the document were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness.
Id at 1184.

18342.H0583.1
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Courts are given discretion to determine when the "business
record"

exception

applies.

"Business

records

possessing

a

reasonable degree of necessity and trustworthiness are to be
received into evidence unless the trial court, after examination,
doubts their reliability*"

Idaho Falls Bonded Produce v. General

Mills, 665 P.2d 1056 (Idaho, 1983).

The rationale behind the

exception allowing business records to be admissible is that there
is "[t]he probability of trustworthiness of records because they
were routine reflections of the day to day operations of a
business." Lepire v. Motor Vehicles Division, 613 P.2d 1084, 1088
(Or.App.1980).
Furthermore, the foundation for the "business record" need not
be proved by the declarant.

In Kirtland V. Tri-State Insurance

Co.. 556 P.2d 199, 202 (Kan. 1976), the court explained that the
foundation may be proved by any relevant evidence and the person
making the entries need not provide authentication if they can be
identified by someone else who is qualified by knowledge.

"The

policy of this section is to leave it up to the trial court to
determine whether the sources of information, method and time of
preparation reflect trustworthiness."

Id. See also Schraft v.

Leis, 686 P.2d 865 (Kan. 1984) [Supreme Court upheld trial court's
determination that the sources of information and method of time of
preparation reflected trustworthiness.]

18342.H0583.1
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This "business record" exception was applied under similar
circumstances in GM Dev. v. Community American Mortgage, 795 P.2d
827 (Ariz. App. 1990). The trial court had awarded partial summary
judgment on a breach of contract claim. SELLERS appealed asserting
that, inter aliaf the evidence submitted by affidavit was hearsay
and inadmissible under the business record exception.
The court set out the same requirements as Utah requires, i.e.
the affidavit must be based on personal knowledge, set forth facts
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and establish the affiant's
competence to testify to those facts.

Id. at 834.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the company
president, who testified that he was the president of the company
and familiar with the records, was competent to testify based upon
his personal knowledge.
The District Court's acceptance of the evidence

in the

affidavit was both appropriate and well within that court's
discretion.

The trustworthiness of Mountain Fuel's Notice is

apparent on its face.

"Form 184" gives notice to a customer when

Mountain Fuel is unable to provide service because of an unsafe
operating condition. Mountain Fuel required the BUYERS to sign the
Notice at the time of its inspection.

The BUYERS have personal

knowledge of Mountain Fuel's inspection as evidenced by their act
of signing the notice. As such, they are qualified and competent
to testify as to the surrounding circumstances.

18342.H0583.1
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Moreover, "any incompleteness of the business entries . . .
goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility."
Wallace by Wallace v. Target Stores, Inc., 701 P.2d 1272, 1273
(Colo. App. 1985).

Although the Mountain Fuel representative

had filled in his employee number on the signature line, SELLERS
take issue because the Notice was not signed by Mountain Fuel.
This fact is not crucial to determinations of admissibility.
In the case at bar, BUYERS testify, based upon their personal
knowledge, that they scheduled Mountain Fuel to connect their gas
line, that upon inspection Mountain Fuel refused and directly
issued a Notice which they were required to sign. Thus, the source
of information, method, and time of preparation establish the
requisite trustworthiness for the business record exception to
apply.
B. Statements in the Buyers' Affidavit, Attesting to Mountain
Fuel's Notice, Fall Within the "Presence Sense Impression"
Exception of the Rules of Evidence and are Admissible.
Rule 803(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence excludes from the
hearsay rule

M

a statement describing or explaining an event or

condition, made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition or immediately thereafter."
BUYERS* affidavit, containing statements from a Mountain Fuel
representative, falls directly within provision (1) of Rule 803.
The statement was made and recorded while the Mountain Fuel
representative physically inspected the furnace. The statement was
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contemporaneous with the observati on o i i. IIM I mint n m 11.-1 L ». nJenet-ij
the representative's

employee

identification

number

and

the

BUYERS did not submit Mountain Fuel
representative actually observed the
r,.--;-

furnace crack.
•

prove

«

Rather, BUYERS

condition of

the

furnace di ihc , ...,<- che BUYERS first attempts:
Rule

803 (

:- derived

irom

the

former

Rule

of

Evidence

permitted a statement uttered
spontaneously while perceiving the event or condit..

Silver

L-94 (Ok 1 . 1 \* 4 '. . t .1 ie

Seal Products Co. v. Owens, 523 P. 2d 109,,

^ statement must
describe something seen, hearo
event or transaction, "
Wasi

Jd.

,.* «<..,.,

declarant 111 f "'"."ii t M

I

SELLERS rely upon Beck v. Dye, 200

12

=su

fortn T.ne cest co determine whether UJ in'i 1 ne statement shouiu oe
admissible as a hearsay exception,
I'll n i i i l ii 1 ii

1 in I

I - n i t ' i n 1 ill

i n d i ni l IIM

ni ni mi 1111 I

exception and meets each prong 01 the Beck test,
condition
rep J
service.

of

the

•

I mi 1
,

furnace,

as

seen

by

the

t in

I'OH

gestae"

.escribes the
Mountain

1 mi 1 s] K H -1 in mi 1 I 1 111 - I n 11 11 ai • 1 - p r i o r

Fuel
to connecting

lade during the course of tit ie transaction between

the BUYERS and Mountain Fuel and was a spontaneous reaction evoked
b
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II.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS AND, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, BUYERS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT.
Rule

56(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

authorizes summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of
fact to be resolved.

The purpose behind summary judgment is to

eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when it is clear,
as a matter of law, that the party ruled against is not entitled to
prevail. Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53
(Utah 1981) .
The determination of ambiguity in a contract is a question of
law.

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P.2d 1311, 1313

(Utah App. 1991). In making that determination, it is well-settled
that the language of the contract, if clear and unambiguous,
controls.

17A Am. Jur. 2d Section 337 (2nd Ed. 1991).

See also,

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).
The question of ambiguity should be resolved from the document
itself.

"It should be looked at in its entirety . . . and all of

its parts given effect.

Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt

Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987). Utah Valley Bank,
supra.
This contract is the form generally mandated for use by real
estate agents.

Hence, the applicability and relationship of the

provisions are commonly used and well-understood.
18342.H0583.1
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The BUYERS do not dispute SELLERS' general dshnj l n i m I I i, ml
specific provisions in a contract will qualify general

provisions

u'li I i.l led-in portions will take precedence
over form language when inconsistencies appec"
case at. bar,

--.i- inconsistency

CONTRA^

change
q^u...

the

-

portions

* language ot the

warranties by handwriting.

specific provisions
filled-in

'

The

jeneir
CONTRACT

To t'•::" :ontrar?
uniformly refer to and encompass

qualify

the general

visions ^f

CONTRACT

*.. --r -

provisions which required blanks

»•• completed, the very section

,L.^vi i,,:;^ ximited the warranties , SELLERS did
nothing i. expressly * ? m i t- any warranties
are iv .* rendered ambiguous merely by the fact
*"1 • ' *

Jpnefc

;

nat the parties urge

;.anklef b n ir.2d 733, 735 (Utah

1980).
Section

i h. CONTRACT warranted that "the plumbing,

-a

lating systems
sound

closing,"

satisfactory working Cv_.na. .

founc

provision l(e*
•K
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The language in this provision is clear and unaltered.

"'Tj.I-W d nil i- mi i
warranties

. ,

'

-^Liv,..
-

,i,

,f the CONTRACT negates the
However, the language

not negate the warranties.

Rather, Provision

11111, r I \ 11 ' '
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Section 1(c) and 6 . . .M and requires a blank to be completed.
[R. 37]

Section 6 outlines the SELLERS' warranties under the

CONTRACT.

It reads, "In addition to the warranties contained in

Section C, the following items are also warranted . . . "

The blank

has been filled in to provide that, in addition to the warranties
in Section C, no other items will be warranted.

[R. 38]

The

effect of this language is to reinforce the furnace warranty.
Thus, the language of this provision is clear and subject to only
one interpretation.
Provision "0" provides that "except for the express warranties
made in this agreement, execution and delivery of final closing
documents shall abrogate this Agreement."

Section 11 provides

that, unless otherwise indicated, the general provisions
incorporated into the agreement.

are

Again, the language of the

CONTRACT is clear and nothing has been added to limit or negate the
warranties.

The warranties are clearly and expressly referred to

and repeated in numerous provisions of the CONTRACT. Regardless of
the SELLERS* present remorse, looking at the document in its
entirety leads to only one interpretation:

the SELLERS expressly

warranted the furnace would be in satisfactory working condition.
Brooks v. Hodgesf 606 P.2d 77 (Colo. App., 1979), proves
instructive.

In Brooks, the parties had entered into a sales

contract for the purchase of a home.
express warranty of fitness.
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engineer

.aspei -.- ;

-

H >w< 3"\? e i:

after

closing, when the buyers went to the1 residence, they noticed a
strong odor emanating from the premises. The lower court held that
the "warranty was breached uj i i m \\\

ni i

m't wtM»n t h*-*

date of signing the contract and the date of closing" and the Court
Appeals affirmed.
In t h i s

capft-

Icl.

78.

1

roiii/n

' .hi'l'.jnK-Mil

should also be affirmed.
r r

T

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED
BUYERS DAMAGES, A T T O R N E Y S FEES,
COSTS AND SANCTIONS.
Under the Contract, BUYERS are Entitled to Recover the
Benefit of their Bargain Which the District Court Properly
Determined to b e the Replacement Cost of the Furnace,
As SELLERS failed

•

issue of damages in the lower court proceedings, they ought not be
JU L O do so on appeal,

BUYERS, however, readily respond

the issues < : lamages
consequences raised

appeal.

Genera] J *. breach <M contract entitles the non-breaching party
" ; \ <i>llj

to rec

| '.

; J IM !; ' '•

1M would have been had the CONTRACT been fully performed.
v

Deseret

Mortuary

Company,

455

u

;

"

}

1969) ,
i -UUM U ± ^ . o ^ n

Alexander v. Brown,

v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d J62, 161 (Utah 1988).
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The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that in determining damages, "the desired
objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct,
practical and accurate method that can be employed. " Even Odds Inc.
v. Nielson, 448 P2d 709, 711 (Utah 1968).

In the case at bar, the

above-referenced principles of law control.
SELLERS

submit

various

theories,

derived

from

general

treatises and federal and state case law, under which they advocate
a reduction in the damages awarded to BUYERS. SELLERS' authorities
cited are not controlling or appreciable and, moreover, SELLERS
fail to meet the burden of proof required.
SELLERS assert that BUYERS failed to prove damages and that
the lower court engaged in "speculation and guesswork."
proper evidence was before the court.

However,

BUYERS alleged in their

complaint that the replacement cost of the furnace was $1,100.00.
BUYERS then testified, by affidavit, that the replacement cost of
the furnace was at least $1,090.00 and attached as an exhibit a
copy of an early bid received from United Furnace.

In fact,

because BUYERS had to finance the purchase, they have paid more
than the amount prayed for and awarded.
Beyond SELLERS' assertion that BUYERS were not entitled to
replace the furnace, SELLERS failed to submit any evidence to
counter the proof of the cost of replacing the furnace or the
availability of a used furnace. SELLERS also failed to present any
legal authority that BUYERS were not entitled to the benefit of
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their bargain
affidavit a

: ^ support t h e i r

not raise a g e n u i n e issue or ta; cis to d a m a g e s . T h e

U L Court n o ' before
without

argume

;amages

engaging

S E L L E R S assert that t h e plaintiff
more

i,. ^J

•* a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e t

from t h e c o n t r a c t u a l

ib

entitled

*

profit

b r e a c h t h a n from full p e r f o r m a n c e a n d

that b y receivi i 1 :j a i 1 = \ \ fi in lac: c= • til i s BU 1 ERS 11 recei v e ::! = L i n i 1 if a ] ]
U n d e r S E L L E R S ' a n a l y s i s , B U Y E R S w o u l d b e entitled to a used f u r n a c e
or to an award :>f d a m a g e s c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h
furnace.

However

As held
(

hp v a l u e of a u s e d
IHILS!

in Keller, Alexander

and Young,

supra,

fa i1 .
BUYERS are

' H i e d to b e >laced in ar a^-od a p o s i t i o n as if t h e C O N T R A C T w a s
lv performer

nrt» t

IMJH I

r ^ic> M i n i

A turnace in s a t i s f a c t o r y w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n .
ixnace is used o r r o w

I li

- - - - ....-* , <>

R e g a r d l e s s ui w h e t h e r

B U Y E R S a r e e n t i t l e d f'%-

: u r n a c e ,n
*,

s a t i s f a c t o r y w o r k i n g cone:.-.
t h e o n l y o t h e r r e m e d y whic*

-

i place t:! *

BUYERS

:ne s a m e

L therr h3r? N i r - *-.•.» p e r f o r m a n c e is t o r e p l a c e t h e
inoperable

furnace

SELLERS
solution.
essence,"

fai

t«

prove

~ "-1

that

r

urnace

was -

viable

From t h e start B U Y E R S c o m m u n i c a t e d that "time w a s of t h e
When

btLLihii^i

L o q u e & i ei I

inhnmm

i n n i m m n«i 11 i 1111

i In

ii

and c a p a c i t y of t h e f u r n a c e , in order t o he 11 * them p r o c u r e a u s e d
f i nan- 1 ,
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the necessary

information.

BUYERS waited as long as they reasonably could for the SELLERS to
produce a used furnace. BUYERS were not offered a used furnace or
even advised that SELLERS were looking for a used furnace.

A

reasonable inference from SELLERS1 silence is that a used furnace
was not readily obtainable.

By replacing the furnace, BUYERS did

not receive a windfall but only what they are entitled to, the
benefit of their bargain.
SELLERS also argue that payment from a collateral source
should have been credited against the damages.

There is, though,

no admissible evidence before the court that BUYERS received money
from another source. SELLERS' affidavit, made upon information and
belief, averred that BUYERS received a refund from the inspection
company. Utah law does not allow statements made upon information
and

belief,

without

personal

knowledge,

to

be

admissible.

Treloggan v. Treloqgan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985).
SELLERS claim that mitigation and the doctrine of avoidable
consequences require that the damages be reduced. Yet SELLERS have
failed to meet the burden of proof for a mitigation defense to be
applicable.
In John Call, the court explained that mitigation operates "to
prevent one against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering
any item which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable
means."

id. at 680.

In order to seek a reduction of damages,

SELLERS have "the burden of proving that the damages shown could
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have been m' limizea

mn ^ u

cinaineerinQ, Inc. » , Manti city
~°~v

Corp. . 79 5 F ?d f~*8 (Utah App
Sect

citina D. Dobbs, Remedies

Pratt v. Board of Educ., 564 P.2d
iL.ERS »

a r g u m e n t that B U Y E R S failed
BUYERS were reasonable
CONTRAL

Tl u • sj

j i

mitigate the damages.
*n t h e i r a p p r o a c h t o e n f o r c i n g
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s idequa 1 .( i: :u : • 1 1 c < ;
*>. i thdi d u i n«

r e s p o n d b e f o r e filing suit
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contention that BUYERS failed to mitigate those damages.

a- stated in Even, the desired objective in assessing damages
II
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BUYERS,
having incurred

* :»

oi

$i,

H

i

replace the defective,

warranted furnace, were entitled __ recover that amount.
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B.
The District Court's Award of Attorneys' Fees was
Adequately Supported by the Evidence, Reasonable Under the
Circumstances and Within Its Discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the calculation of
reasonable attorneys' fees is in the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned absent a showing of a clear abuse
of discretion.
(Utah 1988).
issue

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
Thus, the standard of review for this particular

is whether

the

District

Court

abused

SELLERS argue that the attorneys•

its discretion.

fees, awarded by the

District Court, were unreasonable and unsupported by admissible
evidence. To promote their position, SELLERS rely upon Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974), a Fifth Circuit
case from Georgia which interpreted a federal statute allowing for
attorneys' fees at the court's discretion.

Utah decisions on

point, though, prove more instructive and compelling in this
instance.
When attorneys' fees are awarded on summary judgment, Utah
courts have required the material facts to establish that the party
is entitled to an award and that the amount awarded is reasonable.
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), a Utah
Supreme Court case, summarized

the general principles

to be

considered in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee award.
court

explained
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fees

are

awarded

only

The
if

..

reasonable fee . h t necessaiiiy LuiiLL-.ic^ ,>y ^iiY
"What is reasonable depends upon

: u t e s

a

,.ji formula.

lumber 01 factors
mi illI Hi 1 1 '

which
1 1 1 ! I in I

989/ citing with approval, Wallace v. Build, Inc. , Id. IJtd11 .'i,1 4U I r
402 P.2d 699 (1965).
reaching
a determination of attorney;

•« i

the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of t .1 :ie
attorneys in presenting t h e c a s e , the reasonableness of
the number of hours spent o n t h e case, t h e fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and the result attainted,
and t h e expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.
Ici,

vJabreica

Ii I addition, tiv

i,.iv*- stated that:

y

.

!

^^LL^^O..,

) ,

[Ajlthough t h e amount in controversy cai I be a factor i n
determining a reasonable fee, care should b e used in
putting much reliance o n this factor. It is a simple
fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about t h e same
r
amount
time to collect a note in t h e amount of
$1,000
is it takes to collect a note for $100,000.
Id.
Such - <>

"i^

TtKi «u i\ ,vdv

" BUYERS could get
1:1 le assistance of

the court

evidenced by the record, extensive correspondence

occurred both prior -

the BUYERS filing a complaint and after,
I..

.

i1 1 I

|r

|

' . i

1

been V , . I 1 I I H t admit aily liability under tin CONTRACT.
18342.H0583.1

31

i.-i

In candor, the required attorneys' fees were magnified by the
obstinance of SELLERS and fomenting of the case by SELLERS and
their counsel, as demonstrated by the number and complexity of
correspondence and pleadings in this case and the requirement to
re-trace and re-argue every issue.

Throughout the course of the

litigation, SELLERS filed numerous pleadings filled with irrelevant
information and issues which required response. After judgment, in
SELLERS' Objection to Attorneys' Fees, they failed to submit any
countering evidence to refute BUYERS' fees or to prove them to be
unreasonable.

Rather, they continued to argue the merits of the

case asserting that because the case should not have been decided
the way it was, SELLERS should not be responsible for the fees
incurred.

SELLERS fail to cite any case law which would support

this argument.
BUYERS submitted to the court sufficient evidence to support
the District Court's decision.

A detailed breakdown of the time

and

various

effort

expended

on

the

issues, pleadings,

and

proceedings was submitted, along with an affidavit from BUYERS'
attorney attesting that the fees incurred were comparable to others
providing similar services. The District Court, fully aware of the
legal actions imposed on BUYERS, and the court also having to visit
these issues repeatedly, specifically found BUYERS' fees and costs
reasonable.
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Dixie direct,
determining reasonable fees
amount in controversy.
substantial , i >

4S\

; i^ not. pia; e undue emphasis on the

Although * hp damages in this case were not

" i »•••<

they had incurred thousands 0.1 uunat:
enforce the CONTRACT
attorneys *

damages,

' .1 I

1 -, „„ (

order tu

SELLERS, themselves, have exacerbated the

. -

results of then

r

\ I - ;-

ii I

I

<' < 1. >«»11«11 > I 1

« «>in| > 111

1 1 11 I I

intransigence.

The CONTRACT expressly provided that either party would be
1 1 it H i IUI 'i

agreement.

M 'disi (nab

11

111 1

i rm jy 1

. * ie

BUYERS presented adequate evidence to enable the Court

t : make an i nformed decision

attorneys* fees.

As such, the

D
the record and should be affirmed.
Lah T.dw Entitles BUYERS to Recover Attorneys1
Expended on Appea•
Utah courts hold "
for payment of attorney

c

i rule of law that a contract provision
f^p~ includes attorney's fees incurred on

appeal

. 1 1

contract.

Rosenlof v. Sullivan, o / r> i , u

- - *
.

j , D -{ Utan 19b

See also Management Services v. Development Associates
' '

'

Alexander u . B I U W H , 1 Ii 1

1982) .
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Provision N of the CONTRACT between the BUYERS and SELLERS
expressly provides that "the defaulting party shall pay all costs
and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee, which may
arise from enforcing the contract."

[R. 39]

The District Court

properly awarded BUYERS reasonable attorneys fees incurred in
enforcing the CONTRACT. BUYERS have had no choice but to continue
these efforts on appeal and are entitled to recover attorneys• fees
on appeal as well.

D.
The District Court•s Sanction Against SELLERS• Counsel
for Bad Faith Litigation is Proper Under Rule 11 and Entitled to
Deference on Appeal.
Utah courts find guidance for the application of sanctions
under Rule 11 in Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah
App. 1989) [a case in which the Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees
as a sanction for violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure].

In Taylor, the court explained that whether specific

conduct violated the Rule is a matter of law.

If a violation is

shown, "an appropriate sanction is mandated and we will affirm the
particular sanction imposed by the trial court, including the
reasonableness of any fee award, absent an abuse of discretion."
Id. at 171. See also Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams,
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991).
The court recognized that trial courts have great leeway to
tailor a sanction to fit a specific case. Jd. at 171. Similar to
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confining his objection t<* ieyai arguments, rather than challenging
the fees or their reasonableness.
a i i ::i

de t e r n u n e u

i in 11

i il in
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The court reviewed the affidavit
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mi iiiiiil
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II
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iiiini n h i n r

m

discretion.
SELLERS
unreasoi lah J! =

failed

*

prove

Ra 1:1 i

BUYERS'

LI IERS

attorneys'

fees

were

pe rs. I s I: .ei i I: ] j

1

arguments completely ignoring the fact that the District Court
earlier m

:

in;i;

specifically addressed those arguments.

bad faith and without merit
i.e.

wher

Requiring

^ iolatic-

SELLERS

,.; .
shown,

counsel

sanction was also appropriate.

"authorized

allocate

L.n*. standard L.* Jaylor,

an appropriate

<o i,c- responsible

;.. pay the

In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d, 3 6 5 ,

laintil : r>r

responsibili.

plaintiff's attorney as it deems appropriate.
y i e b 11nil 11 ,i 1 y 11j n 111 I 11

sanction

1111'» i i • 111

«>»»' •«• • ' - ' >«i

and augmented Plaintiff's losses

j

SELLERS" actions,
111 < "m 11 I \

nn t ributed to

require counsel to share 1n

the responsibility of payment arising from bad faith litigation is
l i p p i u"|,i'i i a t e .
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IV.
BY FAILING TO RAISE AN OBJECTION REGARDING
DISCOVERY DURING THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS, SELLERS
HAVE WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL •
It is a well-settled law in Utah that issues not raised at the
trial court level are waived on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P. 2d
938, 944 (Utah 1987), Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah
1986),

Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214, 215 (Utah 1981).

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).
In this regard the Court in Bundy stated:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must
present his entire case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.
Id. at 758, quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp. . 24 Utah 2d
310,

303, 470 P.2d

399, 401 (1970).

Waiver is particularly

applicable when "the problem could have been resolved below."
Mascaro at 944.
BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment three months after
SELLERS answered the Complaint.

SELLERS did not object to the

Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of insufficient time to
conduct discovery.

If SELLERS had objected on these grounds, the

Court could easily have addressed the issue at that time and
allowed additional time to complete discovery.

In fact, even on

appeal, there is no reasonable showing as to how further discovery
18342.H0583.1
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furnace.

T-- r a i p - t h ! - i s s u e < '• <** >• •* ' i s nn a t t e m p t by t h e SELLERS t o
11.,1 1,1! j

keep

to raise this issue a

J! i

! ! . i v : I!1! (

! a i "1 eel

time vmen uic problem could have been

resolved, SELLERS ought. L~ JJU precluded from asserting this issue
n z w.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein,

judgment entered by the District .Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/§^

day of March, 1993.

Patricia L. LaTulipp^, Esq,
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Patricia L. LaTulippe, hereby certify that on the

/

day

of March, 1993, I served upon Defendant/Appellee four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, by causing the
same to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Franklin R. Brussow
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah

84121

#
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ADDENDA

A.

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 803

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-

tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
(1989).

Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event
or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a
617
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memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or e n t r y . To prove the absence of a
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement,
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose\
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
jjj
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, m a r | |
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or|
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained irij
a regularly Jkept record of a religious organization.
k|l
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements <M
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage "era
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, pufti
lie official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a relnj
gious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting!
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable times
thereafter.
"*^M
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family!
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings onl
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, ojj
tombstones, or the like.
$
(14) Records of documents affecting a n i n t e r e s t in property. ThS
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in propj|
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and i\
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have b e e S |
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that °ffic|8
(15) Statements in documents affecting a n i n t e r e s t in P r o P e i ^ : J a
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect aijl
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of *J|8
document, unless dealings with the property since the document w a ^
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the R
port of the document.
618
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(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in
stence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
CX
?17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations,
bulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally
\ed and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an
pert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct
xamination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
amphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness
o r by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or
family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which
located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among his associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may
be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be
provable by evidence of reputation.
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
619
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page, each paper must state identifying information concerning the attorney representing
the party filing the paper. Finally, every pleading must state the name and current address of
the party for whom it is filed; this information
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of
the last page. This information need not be set
forth in papers other than pleadings.
Paragraph (d) The changes in this paragraph make it clear that papers filed with the
court must be "typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type." The Advisory Committee
considered suggestions from different groups
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifically allowed or specifically prohibited. The
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the
requirements that "typing or printing shall be
clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed
with the court complies with these standards,
the papers should not be deemed to violate the
rule merely because they were prepared in a
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this
paragraph also removes any confusion concerning the top margin and left margin requirements (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively),
and this paragraph imposes new requirements
for right and bottom margins (both one-half
inch).

Rule 11

Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an
addition to the rule, requires typed signature
lines and signatures in permanent black or
blue ink.
Paragraph (0. The changes in this paragraph make it clear that the clerk must accept
all papers for filing, even though they may violate the rule, but the clerk may require counsel
to substitute conforming for nonconforming papers The clerk is given discretion to waive requirements of the rule for parties who are not
represented by counsel; for good cause shown,
the court may relieve parties of the obligation
to comply with the rule or any part of it.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment added "and other papers" to the rule
catchhne and added similar language in two
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a),
added the last phrase in the subdivision heading, added the last two phrases in the first sentence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule
(7)(a)," added the last two sentences, and made
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d);
added Subdivisions (e) and (0; and redesignated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 10, F.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Exhibits.

of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose
of supplying necessary material averments nor
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

—Use as pleadings.
While an exhibit may be considered as a part

Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Exhibits.
—Use as pleadings.
Cited.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
^ 23 to 56, 69, 117.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98,
371 to 375, 418.
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photographs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322.

Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369.
Key N u m b e r s . — Pleading «=» 4 , 1 3 , 1 5 , 38V2
to 75, 307 to 312, 340.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
eading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other37
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wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ranted by existing law" does not require him to
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion before filing a medical malpractice action.
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

ANALYSIS

Amendment of complaint.
Nature of duty imposed.
Reasonable inquiry.
Violation.
—Question of law.
—Sanctions.
—Standard.
Cited.

Violation.
—Question of law.
Whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v.
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Amendment of complaint
Amendment by an attorney of the facts
stated in a complaint was sufficient to establish those facts as they would have been by a
verified complaint before the changes made by
this rule making verification unnecessary.
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168
(1954).

—Sanctions.
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a
sanction for violating this rule was not an
abuse of discretion, where the wrong document
was attached to the complaint, causing defendants to incur legal expense in researching the
validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based thereon. Taylor
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

Nature of duty imposed.
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the
attorney's private duty to represent a client's
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 168 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7 (1991).
Reasonable inquiry.
Certification by an attorney "that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after a reasonable inquiry the complaint is well grounded in fact and is war-

—Standard.
Sanctions were improper against an attorney, where opposing parties conceded that no
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B.

PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE
HONRUD
HONRUD,

and

STEPHANIE

Plaintiffs,

) AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT
) ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
)

v.
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

)
)
OF

) Civil No- 910904831CV
)

Judge Anne M. Stirba

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon oath,
states:
1.

I am an attorney in good standing licensed to practice

law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel

for the

Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter,
2.

Nielsen & Senior has spent approximately

47.1 hours

bring this claim to judgment; Neil R. Sabin has billed 1.6 hours

14888

- 1 -

at $130 an hour, I have billed 45-5 hours at $75 an hour, for a
total

of

$3,620.50.

This

includes

investigation,

extensive

settlement efforts, and the drafting of various pleadings.

The

time involved, as per agreement with the client, is reasonable
and comparable with others providing similar services.
3.

The costs incurred for this matter are $135.09.

DATED this

December, 1991.

PATRICIA L. LAttfl/T^PE

On the

//*^f

day of December, 1991, personally

before me PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE, the signer of the

/S

appeared
foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

14888

- 2 -

Q

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS was
mailed, postage

fully prepaid, on the

1991, addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq*
P. 0. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

14888
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day of December,

C.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIE!LSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE
HONRUD
HONRUD,

and

STEPHANIE

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910904831CV

v.

Judge Anne M. Stirba

DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

This Memorandum of Points and Authorities is submitted in
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.
INTRQPUCTIQN
In

February

1991,

Plaintiffs

purchased

a

home

from

Defendants under an Earnest Money Agreement in which Defendants
expressly

warranted

that

the

satisfactory working condition.

heating

system

would

be

in

On July 29, 1991, Plaintiffs

filed this action alleging inter aliaf breach of this warranty.

1A300
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Because

there

warranty,

is no issue of

Plaintiffs

are

fact concerning this breach of

entitled

to

Summary

Judgment.

Plaintiffs further seek reasonable attorney's fees as authorized
by their contract with Defendants.
II.
STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On or about February 25, 1991, Plaintiffs, as Buyers,

and Defendants, as Sellers, entered into an Earnest Money Sales
Agreement,

a

copy

of

which

is

attached

as

Exhibit

"A"

and

incorporated by reference herein.
2.

Paragraph 0 of the Earnest Money Agreement reads, in

its entirety, as follows:
"Except

for

Agreement, execution

the
and

express

delivery

warranties
of

made

final closing

in

this

documents

shall abrogate this Agreement." (Emphasis added)
3.

Paragraph C of the Earnest Money Agreement expressly

warrants that "(c) the plumbing, heatingf

air conditioning and

ventilating systems, electrical systems and appliances shall be
in

sound

or

in

satisfactory

working

condition

at

closing."

(Emphasis added.)
4.

Closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement

occurred at the offices of Valley Bank & Trust Company on or
about April 15, 1991.

At that time, the Defendants executed a

Warranty

subject

Deed

to

the

property,

a

copy

of

which

is

attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference. (Honruds'

14300
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Affidavit, ! 6.)
5.

Neither

executed

in

the

warranty

conjunction

with

deed

nor

any

other

this

transaction

document

contradicts,

disclaims or limits the express warranties under Paragraph C of
the Earnest Money Agreement.
Agreement
effect

preserved

upon

Plaintiffs.
6.

the

delivery

As Section 0 of the Earnest Money

express
of

the

warranties, they
deed

and

its

in

acceptance

by

(Honruds' Affidavit, 5 4, 5.)

On or about April 20, 1991, a Mountain Fuel service

representative
Plaintiffs' name.

attempted

to

connect

fuel

Fuel's Notice is attached as Exhibit
reference herein.

service

under

However, upon inspection, he declined to light

the furnace and reported it to be unsafe.

7.

remained

A copy of Mountain

"C" and incorporated by

(Honruds' Affidavit 5 7.)

Plaintiffs did not operate the furnace between the date

of closing and the Mountain Fuel inspection.
8.

On or about May 17, 1991, Plaintiffs advised Defendants

by letter of the unsatisfactory condition of the furnace, the
serious nature of the problem, the need for quick resolution and
Defendants'

contractual

obligation

satisfactory working condition.
9.

Throughout

to

provide

a

furnace

in

(Honruds' Affidavit f 8, 9, 10.)

June and July, 1991, the Plaintiffs made

numerous attempts to resolve this matter.

On July 29, 1991, two

months after Defendants received notice, a complaint was filed.
(Honruds' Affidavit I 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.)

14300
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10.

On or about September

Defendants,

and

their

12, 1991, the Plaintiffs, the

respective

attorneys,

a

Mountain

Fuel

Representative, an agent from TCI (the company who had inspected
the

residence

before

purchase)

and

two

agents

from

private

furnace companies met at the property to inspect the furnace.

At

this inspection, everyone verified that the furnace had a large
visible split in the casing surrounding it, making the furnace
unsafe and inoperable,
11.

(Honruds' Affidavit H 16.)

The Mountain Fuel representative, present at the above-

referenced meeting, reitereated to Plaintiffs that the furnace
was

not repairable

and

that Mountain Fuel could

not

service until a safe operating furnace was installed.

provide

(Honruds'

Affidavit 5 18.)
12.

Shortly after the inspection meeting, the Defendants

offered to weld the furnace or in someway clamp it together.
Plaintiffs rejected this offer because Mountain Fuel advised them
that

such

a repair would be unsafe because of the expanding

nature of the furnace.
13.

The

(Honruds' Affidavit 5 19.)

Defendants

then

indicated

that

they

were

investigating the availability of a used furnace, and requested
information on the specific size and capacity of the furnace.
(Honruds' Affidavit 5 20.)
14.

On

September

24,

1991,

requested information by letter.
15.

14300

Plaintiffs

submitted

the

(Honruds' Affidavit 5 21.)

Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly advised Defendants that

- 4 -

given the onset of winter, time was of the essence.
however,

never

contacted

Plaintiffs

about

the

Defendants,

used

furnace.

(Honruds' Affidavit 1 21, 23, 24.)
16.

On October 3, 1991, Plaintiffs demanded an immediate

response from Defendant's attorney.

However, Defendants never

responded. (Honruds' Affidavit f 23, 24.)
17.

On October 11, 1991, Defendants replaced the furnace.

(Honruds' Affidavit 5 25.)
III.
ARGUMENT
Defendants' Breach of
Warranties Provided in
Entitles Plaintiffs
as a Matter of
1.

A.

the Express
the Contract
to Recover
Law

As a matter of law, Plaintiffs are entitled under
Section (C) (Seller Warranties^ of the Earnest money
Agreement to recover from Defendants for breach of
those warranties.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
summary judgment when there are no geniune issues of fact to be
resolved.

In Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design AssociatesF

635

P. 2d 53 (Utah 1981) the court explained "the purpose of summary
judgment is to eliminate time, trouble and expense of trial when
it is clear as a matter of law that the party ruled against is
not entitled to prevail." Id. at 54.
This principle applies to the present case.

It is well-

settled that, if the language of the contract contains clear and
unambiguous
14300

provisions, the intention expressed
- 5

-

and

indicated

thereby controls,

17A Am Jur 2d Section 337 (2nd Ed, 1991).

Furthermore, Utah

courts

have

held

resolved from the document itself.

that

questions

should

be

"It should be looked at in

its entirety . . . and all of its parts should be given effect.
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357,
1359

(Utah App.

1987).

In Section

(C) of the Earnest Money

Agreement, the sellers warranted that

''the plumbing, heating,

air conditioning, and ventilating systems . . . shall be in sound
or in satisfactory working condition at the time of closing."
There is nothing ambiguous in this provision.

The Defendants

explicitly promised that the furnace would be functional.
For example, in Shepard vt Top Hat Land & Cattle COt/ 560
P.2d 730 (Wyo 1977), the buyers sued to recover for the seller's
breach of an express warranty.

The court explained that "if the

language of the contract is clear and unequivocal that language
is

controlling

provisions

is

and

for

the

the

interpretation

court

to

of

make

as

a

77

(Colo

the

contractual

matter

of

law."

Id. at 732.
Brooks
applies.

v.

residence,
premises.

14300
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an express warranty

brokers, and

closing.

606

App.

1979),

also

In Brooks the parties had entered into a sales contract

which contained
their

Hodges,

their

engineer

of

fitness.

inspected

the

The buyers,
home

before

However, after closing, when the buyers went to the
they

noticed

a

strong

odor

emanating

from

the

The trial court found that the "express warranty was

- 6 -

breached by

a change of conditions between the date of signing

the contract and the date of closing." Xd. at 78.
was upheld on appeal.

This decision

Id at 78.

In the present case, the contract expressly warrants that
the heating system is to be in satisfactory working condition.
Plaintiff's

did

not operate the

furnace during

the

five day

period between closing and Mountain Fuel's inspection.
there can be no intervening cause.

Thus,

Defendants have breached the

clear and unequivocal warranties of the agreement.
As

in

containing

Brooksf

the

parties

express warranties

of

entered

into

an

agreement

fitness and had, with other

professionals, inspected the home.

Also as in Brooks r when the

Plaintiffs took possession, the condition of the property was not
as they were promised.
furnace

connected,

When Plaintiffs attempted to have the

they

found

it

to

be

inoperable.

Both

Plaintiffs and Defendants, Mountain Fuel, a private inspection
company

and

two

furnace

condition of the furnace.

companies

verified

the

inoperable

Since the furnace was inoperable,

Defendants breached an express warranty under the contract.
B.

Section (0) of the Earnest Money Agreement Explicitly
Provides that the Express Warranties Would Not Merge
into the Final Closing Documents.

Section (0) deliberately preserves the express warranties in
the sales contract from merging into the documents at closing.
It provides that

"except

agreement, execution

14300

and

for express warranties made in this
delivery
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of

final closing

documents

shall

abrogate

this

agreement."

In the

sales

contract, the

sellers expressly warranted that the furnace would be in sound
condition

and

unequivocal

satisfactory

language

working

allows

order.

no other possible

Such

clear

and

interpretation.

Other courts have interpreted similar provisions accordingly.
In Brooks, supra, despite the sellers' contention that the
terms of the express warranty merged into the deed at closing,
the court held that the express warranty of fitness did not merge
at closing.
Inc

v.

Id. at 79. (emphasis added).

Leventisf

773

P. 2d

841

(Utah

Similarly, in G.G.A.
App.

1989)

the

court

considered whether collateral rights in the underlying contract
merged into the deed.

The court held that there was "manifest a

clear intent to preserve the rights set forth . . . " Xd* at 844.
See also; Skidmore v. First Bank of Minneapolis, 773 P.2d 587,
589-90

(Colo App

1988)

["Doctrine of merger

does

not

affect

covenants in an antecedent contract which are not intended to be
incorporated
caselaw

in the deed.

support

the

. ."]

position

Thus, both the contract and
that

the

Defendants'

express

warranties did not merge at the time of closing.
2.

Pursuant to Provision (N) of the Earnest Money Agreement,
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs.
Attorney's

fees

are

generally

recoverable

in

Utah

if

provided for by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988).

The Court of Appeals has also

cautioned that "[i]f reasonable fees are recoverable by contract
or statute . . . it is a mistake of law to award less than that
14300
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amount." G.G.

A.,Inc. v. Leventisr 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989)

(citing other authority).
The contract in the present case provides in Section (N)
that "should either party default in any of the covenants or
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all
costs and

expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . ."

Plaintiffs have tried for months to settle this matter outside
the court.

It is fair and just that Plaintiffs be allowed to

recover the money they have expended.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are entitled to
recover damages resulting from Defendant's breach of contract,
including reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.
DATED this //2%~day

of December, 1991.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Neil R. Sabin
Patricia L. LaTulippe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the
1991, addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P. 0. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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/^lay

of December,

EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This Is a legally binding c o n t r a c t Read the entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)

L I U
VZSm'ZZZ;

A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs.
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as
to its production. Buyer accepts the property in " a s i s " condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection,
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no daim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well.serving the property has, to the best of-Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing) Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issuec
by such title insurance .company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, anc
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest mone>
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay an}
cancellation charge.
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closinc
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prio
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
J . CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leas«:
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

EXHIBIT "A"
PAGE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

^J^^T-WONEYjSALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes(X)

No<0)

feARNEST

MONEY RECEIPT

February 19, 1991

DATE
The undersigned Buyer

D a v i d

as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of

S S t g g h a n 1c

O n e H u n d r e d

HonrUd

< l n d

in the form of
a r aT h i e r s
c h e c k _
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable s>iate Law

South

Am P r o p e r t y Mgmt,

_

_

SJ-l_-U)tN9840

Brokerage

_

QQ/IOQ
_

hereby deposrts with Brokerage

_

_

Dollars ($ 1 0 0 , 0 0

—

—

Received by.

Phone Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at

Knol 1 C r e s t

in the Oty of

Murray

County of

Salt

£ _ _ J

_ 4 —

Lake

, Utah.

subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulaao** utility oi uther easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
accordance with Section G Said property is owned ^ , 1 k , l r
a?

Same,

fi

Rarh^Ta

K e r s e y

as sellers and is more particularly described

a s - a b a v e —

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
•

UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

• Vacant! Lot

t | Vacant Acreage

•

K| Residential

Cornmfflrcial

•

Other

' • Condo

D Other

_

(a) Included items Unless excluded below trus *ale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property
The following personal property shall also be oduded in thu,

and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title R e f r i g e r a t o r

fiale

<b) Excluded Items The following items are spherically excluded from this sale
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS

NOTlfi

n q n Q r represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price

03 public sewer

09 connected

L_ well

•

D connected

D <rnu«itlon water / secondary system

septic tank

D other sanitary system
_§ public water

.

S connected

D private water

•

Q connected

* of «h«res
•

09 nahiiai gas

(d) Survey. A certified survey

other

B electricity

master antenna

E_ connected

D ingress & egress by private easement

Company

D TV antenna

connected

•

D dedicated road
D prewired

D paved

K) curb and gutter

£S connected

t _ other rights

__

——-

shall be furnwsfuwd at the expense of.

Seller

pnor to closing, D shall not be furnished

(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a vtsu* .inspection of the property anc| subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts nt in its .present physical

condition, except

as outlined

ir par^raph

7

2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The trail purchase n,|Ce for the property is
S J X t y - F O u r
Thousand
_.
rv^rcft
0 0 . no
0 0
,_ 64
A A T 0nnci
$

) which shall be paid as follows

1 0 0 . 0 0 which represents the aforeosscrlbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

$

representing the approximate tailance ot CA§H DOWN PAYMENT at closing

$

representing the approximate b*<*nce of an GX|st.ng mortgage, trust deed note./eal estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears tnte-*^r *u
which include

D prince*

% per annunvwrth monthly payments of $ _
D int«i« 8 t,

•

taxes

•

insurance,

D condo fees,

—
•

—

other

.

representing the approx.ma* Glance of „ n additional existing mortgage trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be

$

assumed by Buyer which conation beau interest at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ % P ^ annum with monthly payments of $
which include
$

•

prince*

•

init*«Qst

•

taxes]

•

insurance,

•

condo fees

•

other

__
_

6 3 . Q 0 0 . 0 0 representing balance if an^ .nniud.ng piVK.eeds from a new Mortgage loan, or seller financing to be paid as follows

at

tir\n

_

o f ^.os.ino

Other

$ 64,000.00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer ,s required to assume an underlying o b l ^ o n (,n which case Section F'shall also apply) and/or obtain outs.de financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts
to assume and/or procure same and this offer ,s n_t* mibject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
to make application withm

five

. days * w Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying, obligator, and/or obtain the new financing at

an interest rate not to exceed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ° * - * «" does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within t h i r c Y - t l V C f r q - after Seller s acceptance
of this Agreement this Agreement shall be vo.da_- «« the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to
points not to exceed S 6 4 0 . 0 ' )
Page two of a four page form

«n « .'««•" selle, agrees to pay $ 6 4 0 . QQ
Seller s l r , C < ,

)F > )

Date> £r2i^

_

to be used for Buyer s other loan costs
f

Buyer's Initials^) ( ^ )

mortgage loan discoun
^ -. _,
^e

j/tfpU---

3 CONDITION AND CONVEYf

£ OF TITLE- Seller represents that Seller & nokis title to the property In fee s i m p l e * ^

purchasing the property under a real

estate contract Transfer of Seller's ownership Interest shall be made as s e t W h In Section S Seller agrees to furnish good afw marketable title to the property, subject
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by H a current policy of "title insurance in the amount of purchase price U an abstract of title brought current,
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H)
^
»
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance *rfth Section G, Buyer shall have the
the opportunity to tneoect the title to the subject propertypnor to closing Buyer snail take ti
ject to any existing restrictive covenants,
covenants. including
Including condominium restrictions (CC &.R's)
&JVL/ Buyer
, U has Q has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's pnor to signing this Agreeme
subject
5 VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows
David ^ S t e p h a n i e

~

\ ^Stephanie Honxiid- Joint Tenants

^

6 SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted

None
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be Jimited to the following

None
7 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be sa

pnor to closing (1Q Approval by buyer of condition o± structural, electrical, arid heating systems
(2) Approval by buyer ton condition 6i swunming^pool. (3) Buyer obtaining adequate financing
at a rate of 9.5% or better.
^ fcV
8 CLOSING OF SALE^This Agreement shall be closed on or before

April

^

-.19

91

. at a reasonable location to be designated by

Seller, subject to Section Q Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of
9 POSSESSION Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer +m

(±§ date of possession D date of closing D other

&t

Ci.OSl.ng

unless extended by written agreement of parties

10 AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent " M c D o U g a l - O l s e n
and the selling agent

South

All! P r o p e r t y

MgUlt.

_ r e p r e s e n t s C ) Seller (

) Buyer,

represents ( ) Seller ( X ) Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that pnor to signing this Agreement

written disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her (40y54*t5**-) Buyer's initials yLA

&&

Seller's initials

11 GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION s i t m O N S ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE
12 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller shall
have until 5 : 0 0
MONEY to the Buyer

(AMfF^) F e b .

(Buyer's Signature)

26
/

. . 19 9 1 , to accept this offer^Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST

(Date) <

'

* (Address)

7J

'(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

}\fn f-7cxott^ m Aft A % i w* .^as-sira

{Dale)1

(Address)

x

(Phone)

(

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above
Q

REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

j ( [ COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until
A
specified below.

-"ci

1^.« t , i . v rf—>m ' KM'

(Date)

>W\\

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

""•

—

(Time)

=

(AM/PM)

j

—•

'

-

M(Time)
s PI*
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to accept the terms

.
< '

*-* '

f

1 1 tr

t_,

(Address)

^Yx^^vV
(Address)

*

y vy<
-+

^ 0 ^ ff

fr yrteise J

-•
•
(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE
•

ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTEROFFER

•

REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER

. 0

'-

(Buyer's Initials)

COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum

II

u ~v>

(Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Time)

>p™

-=7/.a~)pnr\
(Buyer's Signature)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement beanng all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed)
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures
SIGNATURE OF BUYER

SIGI
IGNATUI

A
X

Date

T)

^

m

Oate

B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed o n .
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller • Buyer Sent by
Page three of a four page form

Oate
Oate

..19_

-b>

K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on Its behalf warrants
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT ~ NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the_entire agreement between* the parties and supersedes and cancels any
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual wntten agreement of the parties
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wntifia and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
not expressly modified or excluded therein
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Sellerror if {his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
of contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue TronTenforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit r e f w e d to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the nterpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the pnncipal broker in bringing such action
O ABROGATION Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed jvith this transactionTf Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
•

O TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
time is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
delivered by all parties to the transaction
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (Vi) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
at closing
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shaft be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
estate contract therein
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
of the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the'
Buyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage' shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office
V DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays
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ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This A D D E N D U M / C O U N T E R OFFER constitutes:

( X ) a C O U N T E R OFFER

SALES A G R E E M E N T ( T H E A G R E E M E N T ) dated the

Stephanie Honrud

19

day of

a ch, r r(c ) f l ndDale

(

) an A D D E N D U M to that EARNEST M O N E Y

FghmflTy

19 9 1 . between

VtoviA

fT Ra-rbara Kerrey

^

as seller(s),

covering real property described as follows:

5420 South K n o l l c r e s t , Murray, Utah
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of T H E AGREEMENT:

(11

Sales price to be $67f000.00 (2) Approval by buyer on condition of

structural, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool will he
provided by March 15, 1,991,

U3

Buyer obtaining adequate financing nt a

rate of 9,5?? or better will remain as a contingency.

All other terms of T H E A G R E E M E N T shall remain the same. (X ) Seller (
February

26

) Buyer shall have until 5 : QQ

19 9,1 , to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse.

Date

Signature of (

Time

(A.lvUP.M

*3t 0 0 P fV\

(A.M./P.M.)

. '

) Seller (JQ Buyer

^ ^

/

/'-'• '*•''* ?*&*

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER/REJECTtON
Check One
{/(& 1 hereby A C C E P T the foregoing on the terms specified above.
(

) I hereby ACCEPT tbe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum.

Signature
(

S*Z*^^

) I hereby reject the foregoing

L

\tft >'• >•Signature
V M f l - T ^ ^CV\ " / ,
(Initials)

Date

Time

^

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signaUires.^

(

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on

Signature of Buyer(s)

19

Date

, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (

Sent by
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission.

yS*

Signature of Seller(s)

) Seller (

) Buyer.

f\

" Date
,

When Recorded Mail to:
Valley Bank and Trust COL
1S25 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

WARRANTY DEED
AKA DALE B. KERSY
DALE B. KERSEY/and BARBARA G. KERSEY
MURRAY
_ County of SALT LAKE, State of UTAH.
grantor(s) of
hereby CONVEY(S) and WARRANT(S) to

DAVID G. HONRUD and STEPHANIE M. HONRUD
husband and wife
with title as joint tenants, with full rights
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common,
grantee(s)
of 5420 SOUTH KNOLLCREST STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 8410?, County of
SALT LAKE
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS ******
tho following described tract(a) of land in SALT LAKE County, State of UTAH, to-wit:
PART OF LOT 41 A, AMENDED PLAT OF ALPINE GARDENS, ACCORDING TO
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, RECORDED IN BOOK J OF PLATS AT PAGE
138, RECORDS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH.
BEGENNING SOUTH 53 DEGREES EAST 50 FEET FROM THE MOST NORTHERLY
CORNER OF LOT 41A, ALPINE GARDENS; THENCE SOUTH 53 DEGREES EAST
37.821 FEET; SOUTH 96.489 FEET TO A POINT ON A CURVE TO THE
RIGHT RADIUS 30 FEET; THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE TO A DISTANCE OF
66.497 FEET; THENCE NORTH 53 DEGREES WEST 71.93 FEET; THENCE
NORTH 37 DEGREES EAST 125.114 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s), this 15th day of ApriL 1991.
Signed in the presence of
^tliALE B. KERSEY .AKA.rfsLl B. KERSY
BARBARA G. KERSEY

STATE OF UTAH,

cr

}
} 8$

County of SALT LAKE
}
On the 15th of April, 1991> personally appeared before me
DALE B. KERSEY/and BARBARA G, KERSEY
AKA DALE B. KERSY,

the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged

at they executed the same.

My commission expires

EXHIBIT "B"

Form 184

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
Order No.

N O T I C E
Name

,

Address / ^ f ^ c

Your

OCX»^ttxr

:

A,i~t-&£f.<u^iSf rl^

*A-Cis*&« -rs?
7^

has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off
at

• ^ r - '?

A.M.,<tfWt because

j7^~~~<>>

&t

This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection.
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed,
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone #^£^-3^S2^

Signed
^

Customer's
Signature

yj
"^ * ' - -

£fr7
Serviceman

' / / ,
/
^ " / ^ ' ^

EXHIBIT "C"

D.

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DISTRICT 00UR*

II

Neil R. Sabin, (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe, (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

4io?H'91

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE
HONRUD
HONRUD

and

STEPHANIE

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 910904831CV

DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss

We, David and Stephanie Honrud, first having been duly sworn
upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

We are the plaintiffs in this lawsuit and make this

affidavit

as

to

facts

to

which

knowledge.

14300.1
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we

can

testify

of

our

own

2.

We reside at 5420 South Knollcrest Drive, Murray, Utah

84107.
3.

On or

about

February

25, 1991, we

entered

into

an

Earnest Money Sales Agreement, as Buyers, in which Dale Kersey
and Barbara Kersey, the Defendants named above, are the Sellers.
A true and correct copy of the Earnest Money Agreement bearing
the signatures of the parties is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
4.

Paragraph 0 of the Earnest Money Agreement states that

the express warranties in the Agreement survive the closing and
do not merge into the closing documents.
5.
warrants

Paragraph C of the Earnest Money Agreement expressly
that

the

plumbing,

heating,

air

conditioning

and

ventilating systems, electrical systems and appliances shall be
in sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing.
6.

Closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement

occurred in the offices of Valley Bank & Trust on or about April
15, 1991.
7.

After

closing,

on

or

about

April

20,

1991,

a

representative of Mountain Fuel Company ("Mountain Fuel") came to
the property to connect the furnace.

Upon inspection, he refused

to proceed and issued a Notice stating the furnace to be in an
unsafe operating condition.

He explained to us that there was a

large split in the chamber of the furnace and that the furnace
would release toxic gas if turned on.

A true and correct copy of

Mountain Fuel's Notice to us is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

14300.2
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8.

On or about April 26, 1991, we contacted United Furnace

& Air Conditioning ("United") to inspect the furnace.

After the

inspection, a representative of that company told us that the
furnace was unrepairable.

We received a bid

replace the furnace for a cost of $1,090-00.

from United

to

A true and correct

copy of the proposed bid is attached hereto as Exhibit "C"•
9.

We then consulted

the law

firm of Nielsen & Senior

requesting the law firm to contact the sellers on our behalf to
resolve this matter.
10.

Patricia

Senior, sent

L.

LaTulippe,

a certified

an

attorney

letter with enclosed

with

Nielsen

copies

of

&

the

Mountain Fuel Notice and United Furnace's Proposed Bid to Dale
and Barbara Kersey on May 17, 1991.

She outlined the provisions

of the Earnest Money Agreement in which the sellers warranted a
furnace in sound and satisfactory working condition and asked
that they voluntarily replace the furnace.
letter on May 30, 1991.

Kersey's received the

A copy of the letter and evidence of

delivery is attached hereto as Exhibit "D".
11.

On or about May 31, 1991, we received a written request

from the Kerseys for additional information as to who inspected
the furnace.
12.

We contacted Mountain Fuel and were told that Mountain

Fuel would not release the name of the inspector.

We informed

our attorney, and she sent a letter to the Kerseys suggesting
that

14300.3

because

of the difficulty

in obtaining the name of the

- 3 -

04j

Mountain Fuel inspector, a private inspection would suffice to
establish

the

working

condition

of

the

furnace.

She

also

communicated our willingness to allow an inspection at any time.
13.
been

On or about July 8, 1991, after numerous letters had

exchanged

between

the

parties

through

their

counsel, a

letter was sent by Patricia LaTulippe advising the Kersey's that
if an inspection was not arranged within five days, we would file
a complaint.
14.

On or about July 15, 1991, we received a letter from

the Kerseys stating that they had contacted TCI, the inspection
company who had examined the furnace in March, 1991, and that the
inspector verified that it was in working order when he inspected
it.

The letter did not address any further issues.
15.

We filed our complaint on July 29, 1991.

16.

On or about September 12, 1991, an inspection meeting

took place at the property.

Dale Kersey was present with his

attorney, Frank Brussow.

Also present was a representative from

Mountain

from

Fuel,

an agent

United, an

agent

from

Sorenson

Furnace, an agent from TCI, and our attorney, Patricia LaTulippe.
17.

Each

party

in

attendance,

with

the

exception

of

Patricia LaTulippe, witnessed that the furnace had approximately
a

five inch split in the casing and was not in satisfactory

working order.
18.

After the inspection, we spoke with the Mountain Fuel

representative to verify that the furnace was unrepairable.

14300.4
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He

stated

that

the

furnace could not be repaired

furnaces were very unpredictable.
19.

and that used

He recommended a new furnace.

Subsequent to this meeting, Mr Brussow contacted our

attorney to suggest that the furnace be welded and in someway
clamped together.

Having been told by Mountain Fuel that this

was unsafe and that the welding could split at anytime due to the
expanding nature of the furnace, we rejected this proposal.
20.

Our

attorney

concerning

the

explaining

that

availability

of

then

specific
the

contacted

size

and

Defendants

a used

for

capacity

were

furnace*

us

going

of

the

to

check

She indicated

reiterated to Mr. Brussow that time was of the
21.

information
furnace,
on

the

that she had

essence.

On or about September 24, 1991, a letter was sent by

Ms. LaTulippe to Mr. Brussow with the information he requested.
22.
inquire

After the inspection meeting, we contacted United to
if the May bid was still applicable.

An agent with

United indicated that the earlier bid for $1,090.00 was no longer
valid and that replacement cost would be approximately $1,200.00
23.

We did not receive an answer as to the availability of

a used furnace and on or about October 3, 1991 called and asked
our attorney whether we should move forward with replacing the
furnace.

She

asked

us

to

wait

over

the

weekend

before

proceeding, to give her time to contact Mr. Brussow.
24.

On or about October 7th, we called our attorney.

She

said she had not received a response from a message left with Mr.

14300.5
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Brussow's office.

Because of the cold weather, the hazards of

trying to use space heaters with a young child, and the other
related problems of health and safety, it was necessary that we
immediately replace the furnace.
23.

We had the furnace replaced on October 11, 1991.

DATED this /^-day of

/(s'&t/

, 1991.

PJo^d'

//irrMW'

DAVID HONRUD

STEPHANIE HONRl)D~

On

the

/c2- day

of

/(/&(/<

,

19*7/,

personally

appeared before me DAVID HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, the signers
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
they executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

I

.
I
!
I

14300.6
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y<£-Lr ? V
/y&^&K
lafB^SJfej
\&3tiFb*j£J
V^wV'
XiJS^

Notary P\:u"z
.
RICHARD C. CLS./Z.T3 I
^Lak9City,Uteh8C1l7l
My Commission Expires I
December 4,1994
I
StaleofUtah
J

EARNEST MONEY SA1=ES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X)

NO (O)

This is a legally binding contract. Read ttie entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
COtMt.

(Sections)

ICQM—lC

A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs.
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer Is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as
to Its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection,
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private welt.serving the property has, to thebest of Setter's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
In Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defects) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing) Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
by such title insurance,company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
cancellation charge.
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or teases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
a copy of all existing teases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

r
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EXHIBIT "A*
PAGE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM

e«^r*55»X-MONEYJSALES ^AGREEMENT
Legend

YesOO

No(0)

feAWjBf

MONEY RECEIPT

February 1 9 , 1991

nATP

-n™ ..nn^.nn^ R..yo,

David § S t e p h a n U HonrUd

. . . . . . .,„ n .

as EARNEST MONEY. ,he a.oun, of _ O n e _ J J u n d f e c T M ^ T Q g / l O O
in the form of
a Cfl<;hifir<; c h e c k
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law

SSStt

Am

— ^ X Z

'—"

^*«*™*°

"~

*™Vf>Tty ^ ^ ^ k ^ a p O ' « « - by.
OFFER TO PURCHASE

1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated E R N E S T MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 5 4 2 0

—Knoll c r e s t

m the or* of —Murray

subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning r e g u l a r

Same a <; ahdve

S a l t Lake

t Uah

utility o, < M n e r easemente <* rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer m

accordance with Section G Said property is owned b y - M . I c

as

coUnty of

S o u t h

fi

Barb^HTa

K e r s e y

>

* a s sellers, and is more particulariy descnbed

_

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

• Vac*n« Lot
D Commercial

| | V a c a n t ^eaQe
^
Q o
K | Residential ' D Condo
D Other

(a) Included Items. Unless excluded below, i f « sale shall tndude
The following personal property shall also be ncJuded in thi*

fia,Q

<b) Excluded items. J h e following rtems are specifically ex^tded

a f lfixtures a n d a n y o f ^

and

^^y^

rtems

snown In5

^ ^ A rf presently attached to the property

separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title R e f r i g e r a t o r

under

from this sale___NQne_

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. tUviier represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price
G) public sewer

I S connected,

Dwell

D septic tank

• connected

•

Q other sanitary system
H public water
D private water

.

3 connected

•

# of « h * r e 8

other

85 electricity

D master antenna

QQ nation gas

S3 connected

D ingress & egress by private easement

Company_

D TV antenna

• connected

(d) Survey. A certified survey

D connected

imuation water / secondary system

D dedicated road

D prewired

•

paved

E l curb and gutter

25 connected

•

other rights

shall be furmsfttwd at the ttnpense of S e l l e r

pnor to closing, •

shall not be furnished

(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a v s u * .inspection of the property ana;' subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 belowraccepts^t m its .present physical

condition,except

as outlined

i r paragraph 7

2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The tcaU purchase p, ( c e f or the property is
$
5_

__—

$

Thousand
) which shall be paid as follows

representing the approximate finance of G A § H DOWN PAYMENT at closing
representing the approximate b*itance of an ex/sting mortgage, trust deed note,zeal estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed bv buyer,
which obligation bears inte-*sf «t
which include

$

•

prince*

% pef

O intent,

•

annunvwrth monthly payments of $
taxes,

•

insurance,

•

condo fees,

•

other

representing the approximate tmlance of * n additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be'
assumed by Buyer, which d^Wjmtton beam Interest at
which include

$

S j x t V - F O U r

Dollars ($ 6 4 f 0 0 0 . 0 0
1 0 0 * 0 0 which represents the aforesescrlbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT

•

prince*

D int«i os t,

•

% per annum with monthly payments of $
taxes,1

•

insurance,

•

condo fees,

•

other

6 5 . 9 0 0 . 0 0 representing balance, if an* mcUuding pun:eeds from a newWrtgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows

a t tirun of r«.ns.ing_
Other .

64,000.00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

If Buyer is required to assume an underlying otil^wtHon (in which case Section Flshall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts
to assume and/or procure same and this offer is rsd« subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees
to make application within

rive

an interest rate not to exceed

days z**? Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at(

- » 5

% » R« »vor does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

thirty- f i v e ^ after Seller's acceptance

of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidat>»- «« the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to
points, not to exceed $

HO.on

Page two of a four page form

.

In eiV«t «cin sellei agrees to pay $ 6 4 0 „ 0 0

Seller's »ne*«». { ,

1

mortgage loan discount

to be used for Buyer's other loan costs

)
f-^)

yt*&-

n,.->

t-U-91

Buyer's m.t.alsJ^X^)

Pate^^f/

a

3. CONDITION AND CONVT^ NCE OF TITLE. Seller represents taatjSeller&Jiolds title to the property In fee s i m | | l is purchasing the property under a real
estate contract Transfer of Selle. _ ownership interest shall be made as set forth Iri Section S. Seller aarees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by B a current policy of title insurance In the amount of purchase price u an abstract of title brought current,
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H).
1
'
/j
- 4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance-with Section G. Buyer shall have "the opportunity-to Inspect the title to the subject propertyprior to closing. Buyer shall take title'
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC &.R'*). Buyer U has ES has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement

6. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer nMfamr.' DavidXStephanie Hortrud - J o i n t Tenants
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:

None
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:

None
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is triade subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied

prior to ^ino: ( 1 0 Approval by buyer of condition.of „structural, e l e c t r i c a l , arid heatling systepis.
(T) Approval by buyer * on condition of swdjnming^>ool. (3) Buyer obtaining adequate financing
a t a r a t e of 9.5% or b e t t e r .
JLJCLOSING OF SALE^This Agreement shall be closed on or before

April

^

,19

91

. at a reasonable location to be designated by

Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow dosing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer«ft

13 date of possession D date of closing •

&t

ClOSUlg

other

unless extended by written agreement of parties.

10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent " M c D o U g a l - Q l s e n
and the selling agent

South

AlU P r o p e r t y

Mgfflt.

represents (

represents C ) Seller (

) Buyer,

) Seller ( X ) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

written disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. {jf)A^^i

Buyer's initials i K w (£dh) Seller's initials.

11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SfEtmONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
have until 5 : 0 0
(AMgjj) F e b MONEY to the Buyer.

26
/

, 19

AT** /Anditf/s

(Buyer's Signature)

91

, to accept this offeivUnless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST
j

3,//?/?/

)ate) '

//^ih.z^.ii /fve jfpi/i r*?-aa63 sn-u

l

- -^ (Address)

^

(Address)

'

(Phone)

(SSN7TAX ID)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
Q

REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer.

(Seller's initials)

X J COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until J
specified belov^

(AM/PM)

, 19

/m vey
'/v?//rr ' hy

httypr

nnJ

«//

6ty£~fi!t/>

(Date)
(Seller's Signature)

lc
(Date)

Pedes / A

cor, I>

//<-. StufV^ X •}* //* fitfiviAr&- /?n Prmh
Z--Z^-^/

to accept the terms

.

5?SJ?

//jucccn&A

A hr Dam*
7/&&V&

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSWTAX ID)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSNHTOC ID)

CHECK ONED ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNtEfr OFFER
•

REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.

0

COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

X

£ (Buyer's Initials)

cf^C*'

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

iTtma\

•

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement Beanng all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:
SIGNATURE OF BUYER

aGNATUR&OF S E L L E R ^

B. D

Oate

Oate

Date

Oate

0
I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on_

Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller •
Page three of a four page form

Buyer. Sent by

.,19.

-by

K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or oiner entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT - . NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the^entire agreement between* the parties and supersedes and cancels any
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agreement This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the Arties
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wntina and, H attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
not expressly modified or excluded therein
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
or to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by SeHer.nor rf {his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants & Agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit retared to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bnnging the fct?rpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action
O ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement
P RISK OF LOSS. All nsk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
(10%) of the purchase pnce of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transactioriTT Seller agrees in wntmg to repair or replace damaged property
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, stnkes
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter,
time is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
delivered by all parties to the transaction
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (1/?) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
at closing
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
estate contract therein
T NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
of the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the;
Buyer or the Seller notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term, "Brokerage* shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office
V DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays
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THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1, 1987

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes

( X ) a COUNTER OFFER

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated th*

Stephanie Honnid

1Q

day of

as buyer(s). and D a l e

( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

February

f? B a r h a T a

19 9 1 . between D a v i d

Kersey

f\

asseiter(s).

covering real property described as follows

5420 South Knoll crest r Mrrray, Utah
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT

(!')

Sales price to be $67f000,00 (1) Approval by buyer on condition of

structural, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool \sri11 he
provided hy March IS, 1991.

(5) Buyer obtaining adequate financing at a

rate of 9.5% or better will remain as a contingency,

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same Q() Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0
FebTU3TV

26

19 9 1 , to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse

Date

Time

(A M (P M

Signature of ( ) Seller OK) Buyer

^3, (30 O fY\

(AM/PM)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

Check One
OQ 1 hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above
( ) I hereby ACCEPT tbe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum
Signature

(

Sinnatiire*
Signature

y^Z^^

) I hereby reject the foregoing

(( ..»

f~)atf>
Date

Time

(Initials)
DOCUMENT RECEIPT

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures

Signature of Buyer(s)

(

Date

Signature of
of Seller(s)
Seller(s)
Signature

/*
/^

~DaYe

'

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed On .

19

, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer

Sent by
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission
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Form 184

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
*« ^ -r- • * rOrder No..

NOTICE
Name

Address

Your

ocX^-'z^a >C

( J

tt^c

A^^^JSC^u^^

rl^

A M ^ V T/T

has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off
at

^~:/Y

A.M.,<tf*£ because

\7^4-~~^s

^

This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the
above appliance has been inspected for or is tree of any defect other than
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection.
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed,
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone # S^u-^ 5* ^l

Signed

£fr7
Serviceman

Customer'ss
Signature

yj
y)
yj*^-!L_.

.

''A/
/ /

,,
/
y.
y//^-/yf^-^y

&u/mace

3767 South 150 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115
Phone 255-9631
PROPOSAL FOR:

,

/

/

DATE

Jk

NAME

JOB NAME

STREET.

STREET OR LOT NO

CITY

CITY

y * ^ - ^

WE HEREBY SUBMIT SPECIFICATIONS & ESTIMATES FOR

JL /Q& ro&# ^TZ/

/Y#yf7#/<n>S/^u^/f^c^
/6>?Q

0&

It

TAX
TOTAL
CONDITION OF SALE
All materials in this proposal are covered by the manufacturer's guarantee and will give satisfactory service for which such materials were
designed Any alterations or deviations from the above specifications involving extra cost must be borne by purchaser Owner to carry
necessary insurance covering above equipment Our workers are fully covered by workmen's compensation insurance Ownership of equipment shall remain property of the seller until paid in full Contractor not obligated for delays beyond his control Senior citizens
discount included This proposal expires 30 days from the above date
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL
The above prices, specifications and conditions are satisfactory and
are hereby accepted You are authorized to do the work as specified
Payment will be made as outlined above
SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE

T f"C
Cf
EXHIBIT

- v) O

IELSEN
MIE
<$£ ENIOR
^ ^ y Attorneys & Counselors
Since 18&2

Arthur H Nielsen
Gary A Weston
Earl Jay Peck
Neil R Sabm
Milton J M o r n s * t
R. Oennis lckes»t
Mark H A n d e r s o n *
B. Kent Ludlow
Richard M . Hymas
John K M a n g u m
Richard K. Hincks
Noel S. Hyde
Robert P Faust
lay R. M o h l m a n
M a n l y n n P. Fineshnber
Larry L. W h y t e «
Steven F. All red©
Amy A. Jackson
Patricia L. LaTulippe

Suite 1100. Eagle Gate Piaza & Office Tower

A Professional C o r p o r a t i o n

60 East South Temple. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 -

Telecopier (801) 532-1913

Edwin W Senior (18o2-1925)
Clair M Senior (1901-1965)
Senior Counsel
H u g h C Garner
O f Counsel
Raymond T Senior

May 1 7 ,

1991

Licensed to Practice in
© Arizona
• California
t Navajo Bar
t N e w York
• W a s h i n g t o n , D C.

Dale and Barbara Kersey
c/o Curtis McDougal
McDougal-Olsen Construction
1588 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Re:

Sale of home at 5420 S. Knollcrest

Dear Mr, and Mrs, Kersey:
We are representing Dave and Stephanie Honrud concerning the
real estate transaction between you and them.
Shortly after
closing when the Honruds attempted to have Mountain Fuel turn on
the gas, they discovered the furnace to be in an unfit and
dangerous condition. At this time, the gas company informed the
Honrud's that the furnace was releasing toxic gas and had a
"flame disturbance".
Because of this, Mountain Fuel will not
turn on the gas until the furnace is replaced. We have enclosed
a copy of Mountain Fuel's Notice of discontinuance of service.
Under Section C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, you,
as the sellers, warranted that the heating system is sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
The contract also
provides for attorney's fees and costs upon default.
We are
suggesting that you voluntarily agree to replace the furnace and
pay the costs incurred by the Honrud's thus far to avoid
additional substantial expense.
Please find enclosed one estimate of replacement cost from
the United Furnace and Air Conditioning Company, The Honruds are
willing either to allow you to arrange for the furnace
replacement or to make the arrangements themselves. Of course,
if you choose to make the arrangements yourself, the Honruds will
need assurances that a reputable company is installing a good
furnace.

EXHIBIT 0

Dale and Barbara Kersey
May 17, 1991
Page 2

Due to the serious nature of this problem, we expect an
immediate reply within seven (7) days.
Please feel free to
contact us with any questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

cia L. LaTulippe
PLH/ts
encl.
12825.NI211.PLH

P flS3 7 ^

713

RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDED
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL

(See

D

Show vu ,...{txjru i.~.. 0 -,
to:
TT~^«-.~XT

3. Article Addressed

)ale ana Barbara Kersey
z/o Curtis McDougal
WcDougal-Olsen Construction
11588 West 7800 South
tfest Jordan UT 84088

-f^T%9jn^
n^e
1 •
3
Q

~oTSe7^
Registered
Certified
Express Mail

Q

Insured

P I COO
r=i Return Receipt

^avsobroSS^i^^

Signature — Addressee
V

3. Signature — Agent

-

^f-oSe^fSeUverY ^

•^S^98*-238-815
PS Form ^ O * ' '

v

• W i S ^ ^ ^ ^

Reverse)

Form 184

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
Order No.

N O T I C E

,

;

Address .•^"f-Jc £J*~-*~££r. ix^sr rt,

Name
Your

ocjLfr^-t^y

if"

.6-cjsfvts-r/:

has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off
at

f^:/f

A.M.,<f*^t. because

y/C^^^

This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection.
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed,
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone ff/sTV^ *?%**&
Signed __
Serviceman

Customer'ss
Signature

yy,-;

.

;/
A/

..

/
y.

6Z.
&*u/mace
S$ <Jm/i w<mdi(4Mfyi4ia
3767 South 150 East
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115
Phone 255-9631
PROPOSAL FOR.

,

/

/

OATE

4--U -

J±

NAME

JOB NAME

STREET

STREET OR LOT NO

CITY

CITY

_

?/

W E HEREBY S U B M I T SPECIFICATIONS & ESTIMATES FOR

/

/O&.000

^ / Z /

//d>y/7a^^//^uz-Sfpt

^

/Q?o
/sis ihu//^

C0**J6/£

G&

ZL

TAX
TOTAL
C O N O I T I O N OF SALE
All materials in this proposal are covered by the manufacturer s guarantee and will give satisfactory service for which such materials were
designed Any alterations or deviations from the above specifications involving extra cost must be borne by purchaser Owner to carry
necessary insurance covering above equipment Our workers are fully covered by workmen's compensation insurance Ownership of equipment shall remain property of the seller until paid in full Contractor not obligated for delays beyond his control Senior citizens
discount included This proposal expires 30 days from the above date
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL
The above prices specifications and conditions are satisfactory and
are hereby accepted You are authorized to do the work as specified
Payment will be made as outlined above

SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE __

C^sr\

E.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE COUNTY- OF SALT .LAKE

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUDf
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
Plaintiffs,
v
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

AFFIANT SAYS:
1.
I am a Defendant and the Seller of my home in 5420 South
Knollcrest, Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs above.
2.
At no time did I offer to warrant a furnace at that
residence, nor did I so warrant. In the adhesion Offer to Purchase,
Contingency 1(e) drafted by the Plaintiffs/Purchasers, Plaintiffs
expressly accepted the property which is the subject of the sale
according to paragraph 7.
3.
It was my understanding that paragraph 7 was expressly
drafted and included to clearly supersede the general boilplate
language and adhesive provisions of Plaintiffs' form contract.
4.
This contract should be construed against Plaintiffs, because
of the inherent confusion caused by the contradictions of Contingency
1(e) negating warranties, written counter-offer of 20 February 1991
under paragraph 12 of the agreement,
"as is" paragraph B of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Plaintiffs' mainfest acceptance of
that inspection contingency in lieu of warranties by hiring an expert
inspector before closing contrasted with paragraph C of the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement and the circuituous contradiction of paragraph
6.
5.
Paragraph 7 abrogated any warranty and provided Plaintiffs
the right to have the property inspected by an expert to assure the
fitness of the premises and Plaintiff's availed themselves of this
right shortly before the closing, finding the property fit as it was.
6.
The handwritten counter-offer under paragragh 12 also negated
the provision of any warranty and that Plaintiffs were bound to take
the
subject
propery
subject to their own inspection and ALL
contingencies were expressly removed before closing so that sale would
be
a clean deal and I would have no subsequent contingencies
associated with the sale to linger into the future.

7.
That paragragh 6 says "None" and "None" was a further
assurance in my mind that there were no warranties that would be a
subsequent contingency to drag me back into a closed deal.
8.
I expressed to the realtor that the sale was to be "as is" so
the matter would be ended with the sale and further lowered the price
to the point where I made no profit to close the matter with no loose
ends like the subsequent operation of contingencies like a lingering
warranty.
9.
On knowledge and belief, Plaintiff's were assured by their
expert that the home and the furnace were in proper working order by
their expert, relied on same, and later forced the expert/inspector to
return the fee paid the inspector through Plaintiffs1 attorney.
10. The furnace was in satisfactory working condition when the
gas to the premises was turned off on the day set for the closing.
11. The furnace was clean and serviced in November of 1990 by Mr.
Sorenson a reputable furnace service person who found the furnace to
be in proper working condition and I lived on the premises safely with
my wife and our newly adopted child.
12. I netted no profit from the sale of this premises which I
bought in 1983 and only sold the home when it became too small upon
our adoption of a Korean child.
13. After
the
sale
I responded immediately to Plaintiffs
complaint about the refrigerator and reminded Plaintiffs that stocking
a refrigerator with warm food from the store requires a reasonable
period of time for the refrigerator to overcome the warmth and
maintain the cold.
14. After the closing I agreed to come to the premises to show
the Plaintiff's how the sprinkler system, swimming pool system and
digital thermostat worked.
15. In spite of my efforts to assist the Plaintiffs, they waited
more than thirty days after purportedly discovering the alleged defect
in the furnace and never contacted me to negotiate a reasonable
resolution to the purported problem. Instead Plaintiffs hired an
attorney who demanded a brand new furnace, threatened to sue me, and
indicated I would have to pay for her fees. This letter was sent to
the realtor not directly to me.
16. Upon being dunned like this I became suspicious, and the
attorneys lack of candor in the responses to my correspondence only
made me more skeptical. Exhibit A contains the reasonable efforts I
made to resolve this matter short of litigation.
17. After mailed correspondence dated 15 July 1991, EXHIBIT A, to
Plaintiffs' counsel indicating that Plaintiffs' own inspector had
found no defect and waited for a response. I heard nothing.
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18.
On or about 13 August 1991 Plaintiffs* counsel sued me, and I
was forced to hire an attorney to defend me on a matter which could
have been negoitated between the parties.
19.
My attorney made reasonable efforts to negotiate this matter
to an economical conclusion, EXHIBIT B, however Plaintiffs' demanded
of me more and more money for Defendants* attorneys putting a
settlement out of reach.
20.
Offers of Judgment were served on Plaintiffs to no avail,
which included up to half the price of a brand new furnace for this
thirty-three year old, or so, home.
21.
After the sale was concluded and Plaintiff's bought the house
which was originally listed at $71,900.00 for $67,000.00, Plaintiffs
wish to chisel out a better deal, when a complaint about the purported
condition of the furnace can no longer be negotiated in consideration
of the sale price of the premises and Plaintiffs unfairly continue to
demand a brand new furnace and exorbitant attorney fees.
22.
Plaintiffs' counsel assessed her attorneys fees at $1,400.00
before she filed Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, EXHIBIT B,
but now states her fees have swollen to $3,620.50. At $75.00 per hour
that would be about 29.5 to submit a simple motion for summary
judgment.
23.
Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit no where indicates on what
date, what service was purportedly performed and how much time each
service purportedly consumed, nor if counsel, a law clerk or paralegal
performed such services.

STATE OF UTAH
I ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
DALE B. KERSEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I have
read the paragraghs above, and if called as a witness have personal
knowledge of those facts contained therein and can testify they are
true, except as to those stated to be upon knowledge and belief, and
as to those facts I believe them to be true.
^c--,

*^

Commission
Expiree July 2,1992

P*(LE

O

B.

Subscribed and sworn to
before me, a Notary Public,
on 23 December 1991

JANYCEA.3YNDERGAARD
Public
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
My Commission Expires:

F.

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS*
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840
Patricia L. LaTulippe, USB No. 5746
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE
HONRUD
HONRUD

and

STEPHANIE
]) REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE
> TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
;) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

v.

;i Civil No. 910904831CV

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY

]i Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

]

Plaintiffs briefly respond to Defendants' Response to Motion
for Summary Judgment as follows:
1.

Concurrently with this Reply, Plaintiffs have filed an

Objection to Defendant's Affidavit to eliminate both conclusions
of law inappropriately made by Defendant and irrelevant evidence
which serves only to confuse and obfuscate the issues presently
before the Court because it is irrelevant and immaterial to the
issues in this case.
2.

Defendant's

unsatisfactory
Plaintiffs*

affidavit

condition

of

Affidavit which

the

does
furnace

not

contradict

as

is the primary

attested

to

issue before

the
in
this

court.

Despite Defendants' general references to genuine issues

of material

fact at issue, they

genuine material
warranted

facts are.

fail to identify what

Whether

the Defendant

these

expressly

the working condition of the heating system

in the

Earnest Money contract and whether the furnace was faulty, are
matters of law properly before the Court in a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
3.

The out-of-court

statements

in Plaintiffs'

affidavit

fall directly within an exception to the hearsay rule and are
admissible under Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

statements made in Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24
were

"present sense impressions" made while the declarant was

perceiving

the

condition

or

shortly

thereafter,

and

the

availability of the declarant is immaterial.
4.

Plaintiffs' Affidavit, made in good faith and based on

personal

knowledge

Defendants,

and

a

contractual

to

the

sequence

attests

transpired in the present case.
into

evidence

and

show

agreement
of

events

with
that

the
have

The statements are admissible

affirmatively

that

the

competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

affiants

are

Defendants'

request for reasonable expenses under Rule 56(g) is unsupported.
5.

Defendants fail to address legal arguments set forth in

Plaintiff's
present

a

Memorandum
countering

in

Support

legal

of

position.

-2-

Summary

Judgment

Hence,

there

or

to

is

no

competent

pleading

before

this

Court

which

would

limit

Plaintiff's entitlement to entry of Summary Judgment,
6.

Defendants

attorney's

fees.

complain

as

to

the

increasing

amount

In fact, though, Plaintiffs' attorneys

of

fees

have increased and continue to increase due to the Defendants'
own

continuing

legal

efforts,

the

Defendants

obfuscation

of

issues, and refusal to resolve this matter as provided in the
Earnest Money Agreement.

Plaintiffs' affidavit attests to the

numerous attempts Plaintiffs made to work with Defendants and to
settle this matter short of litigation and the documents filed by
Defendants themselves are clear indication of the reasons for
Plaintiffs'

continuing

frustration

and

resulting

legitimate

accrual of fees.

Plaintiffs' fees are subject to the approval of

the

Plaintiff's

Court,

and

counsel

will

readily

submit

further documentation the Court determines necessary.
DATED this

j^^Tay of December, 1991.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Neil R. Sabin
^
/
/
Patricia L. LaTulippe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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G.

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT

Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840
Patricia L. LaTulippe, USB No. 5746
NIELSEN & SENIOR# P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD

;
) OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
) AFFIDAVIT
;
i Civil No. 910904831CV

Plaintiffs,
V•

Judge Anne M. Stirba

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY

]

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, do hereby object
to the Affidavit of Defendant filed concurrently with Defendant's
Response

to

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

for

the

following

reasons:
1.

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 21 contain conclusions of law

rather than testimony as to facts within Defendant's personal
knowledge and as such are inadmissible under Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

Paragraphs

8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21

are

irrelevant and under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inadmissible.
00j

3.

In Paragraph 9, Defendant testifies to circumstances of

which he has no personal knowledge, which is excluded under Rule
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this ^ ^ ^ -

day of December, 1991.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

NeilR. Sabiif

^

-yyz^^^

P a t r i c i a L. LaTulippe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Certificate of Service
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT was served by first
class mail, postage prepaid, on the ^/Qr day of December, 1991,
addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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H.

PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

v.
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Civil No. 910904831CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

ss,

Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon her oath,
states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney in good standing, licensed to practice

law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel for the
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter.
2.

Pursuant to Court Order, the law firm of Nielsen &

Senior filed a Statement of Attorneys' Fees and Costs with the
16221

Court.

The Statement is an accurate reflection of the time and

effort spent on the above-entitled case.

The time involved is

reasonable and comparable with other providing similar services.
DATED this

day of April, 1992.

^ Patricia
^ ^ f e L'T'LaTulippe
^^^-^^^^^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the ZC>^*i day of April,
1992.

'y^duA

\S&^U6*>

NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on
the

day of April, 1992, addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P. 0. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

16221
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I.

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION
OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

]
|
|
]|
|
|

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE
TO MOTION OBJECTION AND
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

)i Civil No. 910904831CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

This Memorandum of Points and Authorities is submitted in
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On July 29, 1991, Plaintiffs brought legal action

against the Defendants for breach of warranty under an Earnest
Money Contract.
2.

On August 28, 1991, Defendants filed an answer.

3.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment upon

which oral argument was heard on March 2, 1992.

16375

4.

Judge Stirba ruled from the bench that the Plaintiffs'

Affidavit came clearly within the rules of evidence and that
Defendants' objections to the Plaintiffs' Affidavit were denied.
Furthermore, the Court held that the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement was clear and unambiguous, that the contract included
an express warranty from the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, that
the Defendants had submitted no evidence contradicting or
countering the Plaintiffs' Affidavit, and that the Plaintiffs
were entitled to damages for the costs of the furnace, and also
for reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
5.

Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to submit to the Court

an accounting statement of fees and costs, upon which the
Defendants were instructed to make objections in accord with the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

Plaintiffs submitted a Statement of Attorneys Fees and

Costs with the Court.
7.

Defendant did not file objections within ten days from

the date the Statement was filed.
8.

On April 28, 1992, more then ten days after the

Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs had been submitted to the
Court, Defendants' counsel sent a letter to the Judge asking that
the Court inform counsel of a date for hearing or how the Court
wished to proceed.
9.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for an Award of Attorneys

Fees and Costs on April 30, 1992, with a supporting affidavit.

16375
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10.

Defendants filed a Response to Motion Objection on

May 8, 1992.
11.

In their Response, Defendants raise numerous arguments,

many of which have already been litigated and decided by this
Court.

For example, Defendants again raise the same issues of

warranty, contract, and the admissibility of Plaintiffs'
Affidavit.
12.

Even though the Court specifically found that the

summary judgment hearing was equivalent to their day in court,
Defendants again demand a hearing based on having previously
asserted the due process right to trial by jury.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are entitled to sanctions against
the Defendants for harassment# unnecessary
delay, and needlessly increasing the cost of
litigation.
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
the signature of an attorney
"constitutes a certification by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper, and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
for a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation."
Additionally, § 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Annotated, provides
that in civil actions the court shall award reasonable attorneys
fees to the prevailing party "if the court determines that the
16375
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action or defense to the action was without merit, and not
brought or asserted in good faith . . .

"

Jd. at 442.

Under both provisions, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award
of attorneys fees and costs.

Defendants' objection demonstrates

why this case has continued in the manner it has, and why the
attorneys fees and costs are at their current level.
Disregarding the court's ruling, Defendants raise arguments,
previously heard and decided by this Court, to again be addressed
at an evidentiary hearing.

Such action is an inappropriate

attempt on Defendants' part to prolong or delay the final outcome
of this case.

CONCLUSION
For the integrity of the judicial system, matters ought to
be handled in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules
of Evidence.

Otherwise, the burden is placed on opposing parties

to bear costs of frivolous motions, etc.

Plaintiffs suggest that

under the circumstance, this is an instance when sanctions are
appropriate.
DATED this

day of May, 1992.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

16375
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the
May, 1992, addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq,
P. O. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

/OW^^
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day of

